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This publication consists of two papers: the first "Gang Organization
and Migration" is a descriptive work based on interviews with
California inmates during the Spring and Summer of 1988 and 1989.
The second, "Drugs, Gangs, and Law Enforcement" is more reflective
in tone and describes interviews with and observations oflaw
enforcement responses to gang migration.

GANG ORGANIZATION AND MIGRATION

Gang kids and street crime are scarcely a novel feature of
the urban American landscape - although many of us
long for the good old days of safe streets. The benchmark
study of the urban gang is still Frederick Thrasher's of
1,313 Chicago gangs, first published in 1927. 1 The
disorder and violence of these gangs appalled Thrasher.
He observed that the gangs were beyond the ordinary
controls of police and other social agencies, beyond the
pale of civil society. He saw "regions of conflict" that
were "like a frontier." He described gang youth as
"lawless, godless, wild."
Of these youthful gangsters, only 7.2 percent were
"Negro." Located in economically disadvantaged
neighborhoods, the Chicago gangs of the 1920s were
composed of children of immigrants -mostly Poles,
Italians and Irish, mixed with Jews, Slavs, Germans and
Swedes. Their moral posture seems scarcely different
from today's black youth. "Stealing, the leading predatory
activity of the adolescent gang," Thrasher wrote, "is
regarded as perfectly natural and contains no more moral
opprobrium for the gang boy than smoking a cigarette."
Today's youthful gangsters sell illegal drugs, particularly
crack cocaine, with similar moral abandon. And armed
with semi-automatic military weapons, they are capable
of far greater injury to themselves and others.
It was in light of these public and law enforcement
concerns that we began our research on street drug
dealing, particularly cocaine trafficking, in the summer of
1988. At that time, there was increasing interest on the
part of the general public and law enforcement officials
about the role played by street gangs, particularly Los
Angeles street gangs, in drug sales and street violence
within California. There was also some controversy over
the issue since law enforcement officials perceived the
gangs to be playing an increasing role in drug selling,
while the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsored
research by University of Southern California (USC)
sociologists Malcolm W. Klein and Cheryl L. Maxson
found these perceptions of gang involvement to be
exaggerated.2 Based on our interviews, and
reinterpretation of their data, we did not. With that
background, we addressed five questions in our earlier
report: 1) How is drug distribution in California related to
the gang phenomenon? 2) How are youngsters socialized
into the drug business? 3) How is street drug dealing
organized? 4) What sort of financial and contractual
arrangements does street drug dealing entail? 5) What is
the market?

This summer (1989) we continued to study these
questions, while concentrating on three others: Why have
gang members migrated to sell drugs in other areas in the
United States, as well as to other parts of California? How
has law enforcement responded to the gang migration
phenomenon? How effective is the law enforcement
response in reducing the supply of drugs, the demand for
drugs and the displacement of drugs from one jurisdiction
to another?

Why have gang members
migrated to sell drugs in other
areas in the United States, as
well as to other parts of
California? How has law
enforcement responded to the
gang migration ...
Clearly, gang migration to sell drugs is becoming a
significant issue for criminological theory, public
understanding and law enforcement policy. Thus, by late
1988 police departments all over the country, from
Shreveport, Louisiana, to Kansas City, Missouri to
Seattle, Washington were reporting that California gang
members were extending their operations. Law
enforcement agents have often convened to discuss this
issue. For example, the FBI's Kansas City, Missouri, field
office and the Kansas City Police Department invited law
enforcement officials from Los Angeles and seven other
cities- Sacramento, Denver, Seattle, Oklahoma City,
Phoenix, Portland, Oregon and Anchorage, Alaska- to
discuss problems caused by the hundreds of Los Angeles
gang members who are travelling out of town to sell
cocaine.3
From the perspective of criminological theory, two polar
and conflicting theories seem plausible as explanations of
gang member migration. At one pole is the organized
crime infiltration or "mafia" theory. Under it, street gangs
have evolved into sophisticated organized crime groups,
who consciously evaluate and target particular markets.
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Members are assigned territories to work, while
maintaining strong economic and filial links with the host
gang.

... gang culture generates
values and understandings and
trust relationships, which
facilitate but do not direct the
1nigration of members.
The symbolic association theory lies at the other
explanatory pole. In that view, a young man from the old
neighborhood, who may or may not have been an active
gang member, migrates to a new city and sets up a new
gang, with few or no links to the old gang, but using the
Los Angeles gang name because of its panache. Based on
our interviews with 60 inmates and wards of California
Correctional Institutions, plus law enforcement and
correctional local, county and state officials in California,
plus federal officials and local police in Kansas City and
Seattle, we shall argue that neither of these theories
accurately captures reality. The relation between gangs,
drugs and gang migration is neither as organized as the
first model suggest<; nor as disconnected as the second.
Instead, we propose that the data we have developed best
fit what we are calling a "cultural resource" theory, which
argues that gang culture generates values and
understandings and trust relationships, which facilitate but
do not direct the migration of members. Cultural gangs,
we conclude, are initially organized horizontally, stressing
values of neighborhood, loyalty, and the equality that
obtains among members of a family. By contrast,
Northern California gangs arc organized vertically, with
status in the gang dependent upon role performance.
This theory may also be applicable to Eastern gangs, such
as the Jamaicans, and helps to explain a puzzling and
otherwise inexplicable finding: that San Francisco Bay
area gangs don't travel or travel very rarely- even to
Sacramento- in contrast to Los Angeles based Bloods
and Crips, who sell drugs from Shreveport, Louisiana to
Seattle, Washington- as well as Sacramento. We
believe that our research has uncovered an interesting and
perhaps surprising paradox: that gangs which were
initially culturally organized can draw upon more
resources to support migration to sell an illegal product
than "entrepreneurial" gangs organized for the specific
purpose of selling drugs. To understand why that is so it
will be useful to review last year's findings supplemented
by our interview findings from this year.
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The Continued Rise of
the Entrepreneurial Gang
Our most recent. research partially supports one of the
principal findings of our first report that California urban
drug selling gangs can usefully be divided along
"cultural" versus "instrumental" lines and that at least
among African-American Los Angeles gangs there is a
dynamic movement from the former towards the latter.
Our major thesis is: as this occurs, the developing
entrepreneurial activities of Los Angeles gang
members are supported by the resources of traditional
gang membership, which include horizontal
organizational, loyalty norms and favored status. This
foundation is especially important in shoring up migratory
selling. By contrast, vertically organized entrepreneurial
gangs do not enjoy these resources.
Cultuml gangs, as we described in The Social Structure of
Street Drug Dealing, typically hold respect, fraternity,
trust, and loyalty to gang and neighborhood as bedrock
values. These gangs are strongly grounded in
neighborhood or territorial identity, tend to extend across
( generations. While the cultural gang routinely engages in
1 criminal activities including the black market, these gangs
exist prior to and independent of the illegal activities in
which they arc engaged. The criminal acts do not define
either the identity of the gang or its individual
members. Entrepreneurial gangs, by contrast, are
business-focused with financial goals paramount. In these
gangs, members enter the gang for instrumental
(economic) reasons, fealty of gang membership tends to

Cultural gangs employ violence
predominantly as a symbolic
aspect of gang loyalty and
identity.... the entrepreneurial
gang employs violence for the
purpose of controlling drugselling territory or enforcing the
loyalty norms of the operation,
rather than for gang or social
identity per se.
depend on economic (usually drug-related) opportunities
offered by leaders, and the gang is motivated by profits
and the control of markets. These gangs tend to be viewed
by their members as "organizations," and are considered
as a strict "business" operation.

The cultural gang is a tightly knit primary group, an

1 extended family, in the interpretation offered by
members. The entrepreneurial gang is like a business
organization. Gang members may enjoy recreational
activities together, similar to the way employees and
managers of a small business do, but these activities are
contingent, not central. A sociologist would say that the
cultural gang operates within a symbolic interactionist
framework, responding to previously developed social
norms, while the entrepreneurial gang is purposively
rational, valuing instrumental and strategic action.4
How each gang type employs violence is central to
understanding their different institutional frameworks.
Cultural gangs employ violence predominantly as a
symbolic aspect of gang loyalty and identity.
Entrepreneurial gangs may employ violence with
comparable savagery, but with different goals. That is, the
entrepreneurial gang employs violence for the purpose of
controlling drug-selling territory or enforcing the loyalty
norms of the operation, rather than for gang or social
identity per se. The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department
investigated 96 homicides in 1988. They identified only
seven as "drug-related." The remainder were classified as
"gang-related."5 The infamous Crips and Bloods gangs
apparently do most of their violence over matters of
honor.
We observed in The Social Structure of Street Drug
Dealing the dynamic movement of African-American Los
Angeles gangs from symbolic interaction to the purposive
rationality: "(1)he situation of the Los Angeles gangs ..
seems to be changing, indeed dynamically so, as the
values associated with drug marketing come to dominate
members."6 And we continued, noting the specific
importance of such attributes as initiative and ambition in
African-American gangs and explained why these gangs
are particularly likely to transform their role in the
marketing of cocaine.
Since crack cocaine appears to be the most profitable
drug, and since crack cocaine is sold mainly by AfricanAmerican street dealers, the sale of that drug seems to
have blurred the distinction between the cultural and the
entrepreneurial gang. African-American L.A. cultural
gangs, which were never as tightly identified with the
neighborhood as Chicano gangs, are increasingly
becoming instrumental in their relationship with drugs.
African-American gangs seem to prize individual
initiative and ambition as indicia of status. As a result,
African-American L.A. cultural gangs seem increasingly
to look like gangs instrumentally designed for the sale of
drugs.7
Our recent research suggests that the movement from the
symbolic interactionist to the purposively rational mode
has affected Hispanic gangs as well, although probably

not as strongly as it has African-American gangs. In our
current research, we found that both environmental
factors- such as law enforcement efforts and increased
drug selling competition - as well as the internal
dynamics of the gangs are propelling this move towards
professionalization and entrepreneurialization. It is also
clear this change has become more pronounced over time.
We note and elaborate on the movement here because of
its important policy implications.
It is clear from our interviews as well as from common

sense that the changing role of urban gangs in street drug
dealing is occurring against a dynamically changing
community backdrop. The urban neighborhoods affected
by gang, drug, and violent activity have come under
intense public and police scrutiny, and related law
enforcement efforts. The media have focused on such

... environmental factors such as law enforcement efforts
and increased drug selling
competition - as well as the
internal dynamics of the gangs
are propelling this move
towards professionalization and
entrepreneurialization.
neighborhoods - across the country - neighborhoods
that have reportedly become saturated with the drug
"epidemic" and where violence has escalated to
unprecedented levels.
Los Angeles has come to occupy perhaps the preeminent
position in the United States for the importation of
cocaine.8 As we stated in our previous report, the price of
cocaine has fallen precipitously from $60,000 to $12,000
a kilo. Some of our most recent interviews suggest that
just in the last year this price has fallen further still, to
$9,000-$10,000 a kilo. More recently, prices seem to have
risen.
Our current research confirms these public perceptions
about the changing arena within which urban Los Angeles
drug selling occurs. Our most recent inmate and ward
respondents were almost unanimous in citing an increase
in law enforcement efforts and pressure, an all-around
tightening of the drug trade, and a major increase in the
incidence of violence. Across the board, from Modesto to
San Diego the respondents reported that law enforcement
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has stepped up their efforts to curtail the drug trade and
gang activity.
Most importantly, there was near unanimity that these
efforts were having an impact on their drug business, and
this was particularly true for Los Angeles. The

... seller participation in the
·L.A. urban drug market is
perceived to have become
markedly more difficult, more
dangerous, and less lucrative in
just the last three years.
interviewees were similarly in agreement on the
tightening pressures of the illegal drug trade, citing such
factors as the precipitous decrease in the cost of drugs and
an increase in the number of drug dealers, the
conspicuous success of many of those already involved in
the drug trade, and the escalation and banalization of
violence.
It is clear, in other words, that seller participation in the
L.A. urban drug market is perceived to have become
markedly more difficult, more dangerous, and less
lucrative in just the last three years.

If we think of gang values and organization as potentially
facilitative of drug marketing, the factors discussed above
significantly affect the role of gangs in the Los Angeles
drug business. Based on our interviews, we conclude that
these factors have bolstered the power and position of the
Los Angeles gangs, and we believe that this is fueling a
transition from the cultural towards the entrepreneurial
gang.

Drug Salience in Cultural Gang Membership
One strong indication of the shift from the cultural to the
entrepreneurial gang is a change that seems to be
occurring, at least in Los Angeles, in the ambition of
youths that seek to join gangs. Some of our interviews for
our earlier report suggested that individuals are being
attracted to gangs not for what they represent to others in
the neighborhood, but rather for what they represent in
opportunities for drug dealing. Whereas simply joining
the gang and attaining one of its more respected stations
used to be the paramount, sometimes the only goal, it now
seems that youths are increasingly interested in joining

4

the gang for the economic benefits conferred by such
membership. Since 1985 these economic benefits have
largely been associated with access to the world of drug
dealing. In the words of one young gang member:
"People joining, I figure myself, they join the
gangs, because in the gangs, I guess if you got
a gang behind you, you stronger. It's easier to
distribute cocaine if you got a lot of people to
sell to or to sell for you. It's safer because
there's one person that come in our
neighborhood that want to sell cocaine, if
nobody know him, then whatever he got ...
it's going to be ours ... " 9
Complimenting this shift in the motivation of youths
joining Los Angeles gangs is a loosening of gangmembership criteria in favor of one's involvement in the
drug trade. Position in the drug business is increasingly
becoming accepted as the new passport to status in
traditionally cultural gangs. Our previous research
showed that even within cultural gangs one can now
attain the status of "homeboy" through adoption if one
successfully sells drugs for another higher ranking
homeboy, or even just brings drugs to the set. One of the
respondents reported how this adoption mechanism
worked:
"If they sold dope for me, that would be my
homeboy, and if he's my homeboy then he's
everybody's homeboy. As they say workers,
or whatever, that's my worker, so ... he's in
with everybody. Something happen to him,
it's all our responsibility just as it's his
responsibility. " 10
A second commented on the changing criteria of
membership:
"Some people say they get walked on the set
or jumped on the set ... Now it's different ...
there's dudes I see here that be telling me
they're from my neighborhood, and I'm
sa yin', 'I don't know you. When did you get
in our neighborhood?' But it's different
because you got drugs - cocaine. " 11
"Most members of the clique would deal
rock. Some members would take rock. But
those that use the rock - we still consider
them as homeboys- but we don't too much
fuck with them because they's the one that's
going to bring us down."
" ... like if you is my homeboy and you start
to smokin' dope and like, you was my
acebone, and I see you going down the hill,

every time I see you puffin' on something I'm
going to beat you down until you stop."

Drug Dealing Benefits of
Cultural Gang Membership
In The Social Structure of Street Drug Dealing we
reported that being a member of a gang benefits and
facilitates drug dealing success. 12 This facilitation was
apparent in a myriad of ways. Gangs, for example, offer a
rich source of shared marketing information. Information
about who sells what for what price and who has which
drugs available is routinely and more easily
communicated along gang lines. The gang member can

Gangs, for example, offer a rich
source of shared marketing
information.
also rely on his "homeboys" for protection and concerted
retribution if anything were to happen to him on or
outside his gang turf. Gang members, furthermore, enjoy
easy access and control to territorial markets. They can
sell drugs in their own neighborhood without intruding
upon the turf of others. In return, they can exclude others
from selling on their turf- and this territorial monopoly,
as mentioned, is backed by force since the gang
automatically protects against outside intruders. Finally,
there is a well-developed and virtually sacrosanct sense of
trust inhering in the "homeboy" relationship, so that gang
members are expected not to betray other members to the
police or rival gangs.
One of our current respondents offered an interesting
analogy pointing to this basic truism that being a member
of a gang does facilitate drug dealing:
"[Being a gang member] is just an easier way
to get in [to drug dealing]. It's like if you
going to get a job and you have a high school
diploma. If you don't have one, you ain't
gain' to get the job."
Our current research confirms that the above advantages
still benefit gang-affiliated dealers. It appears, moreover,
that the benefits of gang membership have actually and
even significantly increased over time. This is a second
indication that traditionally cultural gangs are reorienting
towards the drug trade, and the reorientation is further
evidenced in several respects:

First, the ready trade of drug dealing information within
gangs has mushroomed and solidified into a full-blown
apprenticeship system for those just entering the drug
trade. This provides benefits both for the new inductees as
well as for the more established dealers. Older gang
members often not only introduce younger members to
drug dealing but also routinely offer these younger
members pre-packaged drugs on consignment, to be sold
for easy "double-up" profit. 13 This economic "good will"
gesture is, if need be, accompanied by instruction in such
things as the standard quantities of drugs to be sold, the
going prices, whom to sell to and whom to avoid, the best
locations to sell, and the best way to avoid being caught
by police. In tum the older gang member-dealer can count
on a steady peddler of his contraband. He can also call on
the younger member to perform various illegal tasks ranging from holding drugs to working shifts in a rock
house to carrying drugs between locations - to further
insulate the older dealer from police scrutiny.
Second, the type of drug dealing information being
exchanged within gangs has expanded to encompass the
new out-of-town and interstate drug trafficking
operations. Information on the best and least risky, and
least competitive out-of-town locations is now transmitted
through the gang, as well as information on law
enforcement presence and tactics in the various new
locations.
Third, the web of support expected of and provided to
fellow gang members has expanded beyond mere
protection, and it has become increasingly economicoriented. Such provision of support for fellow gang

... the type of drug dealing
information being exchanged
within gangs has expanded to
encompass the new out-of-town
and interstate drug trafficking
operations.
members is expected on demand, and includes such things
as lending money, fronting drugs, and providing guns for
a "mission." In several of our most recent interviews we
were told that the provision of this sort of support has
gone beyond loans to include an expectation of outright
gifts, usually of money or drugs but even of such things as
clothes or a car. These gifts seem to be given under two
circumstances - when a young apprenticing drug dealer
has done particularly well he might be rewarded with
gifts, or if a gang member goes to prison, largess is
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expected both to keep him well-equipped in prison and to
ease his transition back into the drug business upon his
release. If a gang member fails to provide this sort of
support to a fellow gang member in need, his reputation
and thus standing are diminished:
"If you was my homeboy and I asked you for
(some money) and he says "no I can't," but
you know he got it, and he refusing to assist
another one of his homeboys, he got to go.
Either somebody's going to rob him, kill him,
or kick him off the set."
· Yet gang support, we found, does not stop here. It now
also includes an expectation - in addition to the fronted
or free drugs and cash - of provision of bail money
when a homeboy is caught, to enable a recently freed
homeboy to function in the neighborhood (and in
business). Gang members can also count on a relatively
secure immunity from being ripped off, or "being jacked"
as it is called, by fellow gang members. Finally, as
always, gang members enjoy a special priority in
obtaining drugs from their fellow members. Thus, gang
membership offers one of the most secure, reliably
consistent supply of drugs.

Expanded Control of
Drug Dealing Territories
The ultimate drug dealing benefit conferred on gang
members has been expanded gang - cultural gang control of drug selling territories. This control, in fact,
appears to have intensified; so much so that it deserves
independent consideration as a direct indication of the
shift from the cultural towards the instrumental gang. Our

'Gangs, they control ... they
neighborhood. They control
they neighborhood because it's
gang territory.'
most recent set of interviews suggests that gang control of
drug dealing in urban Los Angeles neighborhoods has
intensified as compared to our research just last summer.
Several respondents speak to the new authority of the
gangs in regulating local drug peddling:
"If they knew you, it was ok. That's the thing
about it, you can't go in nobody else's 'hood
and sell - you signing your own death
warrant, if you do that."
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"Gangs, they control ... they neighborhood.
They control they neighborhood because it's
gang territory. But a person can move a drug
house in that neighborhood, as long as they
show the gang respect ... It's the way you
present you' self."

"In our neighborhood, can'tjust anybody
come up there and sell drugs and stuff. If you
not a enemy of ours, and you on the cool side,
everything's alright. But other than that the
homeboys, they keep a tight lock on the
neighborhood. They don't let everybody
come up there ... "
The organization of street drug dealing has evolved to
where one must at least obtain the tacit consent of the
neighborhood gang, if not a more formalized business
understanding, like providing a cut of the proceeds, to
continue to operate. This control is evidenced primarily in
three respects: gangs uniformly prevent rival gangs from
selling in their neighborhood; the purview of independent
dealers now is limited, except for wholesale distributors,
whom we discuss elsewhere; gangs enforce their control
by providing organized, concerted responses to breaches
of their power, as, for example, offering protection to
neighborhood drug dealers who might otherwise be
ripped off.
At the same time, no respondents reported that "sets"
completely control the supply of drugs in the
neighborhood. Sets, by virtue of their power in the
neighborhood, might enjoy de facto control over drug
supply, but this has never been reported as an explicit aim
or accomplishment of a set.

The New Ambition of Cultural Gangs
Against these developments in the L.A. drug market we
found an interesting and paradoxical counter-trend to the
unabated rise of entrepreneurial values. Although the
values of the cultural gang consistently protect and
facilitate gang member participation in drug dealing, it
now seems that the ascendance of drug dealing is
undermining the cultural understanding of the gang. We
note the emergence of this conflict in three key respects:
First, as we reported in The Social Structure of Street
Drug Dealing, participation in cultural gang violence, or
"gang banging," traditionally has been one of the primary
means for younger gang members to accumulate respect
and position within the gang. While the continued
importance of engaging in such violence should not be
underestimated, our research does pick up a subtle change
in orientation which seems to be occurring. It seems youth

are now engaging in gang-related violence not simply to
enhance their position within the gang, but rather to
enhance their prospects in the drug trade, at least insofar
as the trade is dominated by gang members in many
neighborhoods.
This change of emphasis is supplemented by the fact that
attaining status and respect within the gang - assisting
and participating in the drug dealing activities of older
gang members - now seems to have taken on an
independent significance for the younger members.
"Coming up" in the gang now has as much to do with the
money one is making as the overt acts committed in fealty
to the gang.
This shift away from the traditional activities of the gang
may be undermining what is considered to be traditional
conduct. Quite consistently it was reported that gang
membership eventually culminates in the undistracted
pursuit of drug sales. One older gang member reflected on
this diminution of older gang members' involvement in
the gang in favor of full-time drug dealing:
"Like, ... some of them [fellow gang
members] see themselves as high rollers ...
they done got too old, so they not really into
gang banging anymore. It's the younger
generation that's comin' up. The people my
age [20], they kickin' back now, they out
selling drugs and kickin' back now; they
lookin' to the future. You got the people
under us comin' up and they doin' the driveby's and all that because they trying to make a
name for theyself. They tryin' to make a
reputation .... The reputation helps them out
... movin' up the ladder."
Another member put it more baldly:
"It's hard to do it [gang banging] if you got a
lot of money. Cause you can't put all your
time into trying to kill somebody else, and
selling dope- you can't do it. You goin' to
jail sooner or later for a long time. So either
you gonna try and have some money and go
to jail like that for a long time, or you're
gonna try and kill. People who got it good as
far as selling dope, they stop gang banging,
they don't do it no more."

Partners out of Enemies: The Rise of
Inter-gang Transactions
Our most recent research suggests a decrease in gang
loyalty in favor of drug dealing aims - ripoffs, snitching

-particularly in light of the tightening L.A. market and
the increase of police pressure.
"I notice its [loyalty] changing a bit now,
'cause now they givin' out more time. If my
homeboy did a crime, and I didn't have no
part of it, I'd tell now. You know what I'm
saying, I'd tell now 'cause I ain't doing no

time ... "
It must be noted, however, that the threat to the individual
from gang values is still present. The previous respondent
continued:
"But the allegiance is still there to the
homeboy ... you tell the wrong person, that's
your life."

'The big change that came,
came in 1984. . .. back in
the old days it was like
everybody was together, like a
big old family. Now ever since
the drugs hit the street,
everybody wants to go their
own way, forget about the
neighborhood ... '
Protection from robbery - and its equally important
corollary of trusting your fellow gang members not to rob
you- is crucial to the support gangs offer drug dealers.
But precisely this security is now being called into
question. Ripoffs between gang members are on the rise.
In the words of one gang member:
"The big change that came, came in 1984.
That's when the drugs started hittin' the
street, [and] everybody gettin' into it. It's just
like, back in the old days it was like
everybody was together, like a big old family.
Now ever since the drugs hit the street,
everybody wants to go their own way, forget
about the neighborhood ... People get a lot of
money, [and] sometimes the homeboys get
jealous and stuff ... and sometimes my own
homeboys take from the homeboys."
Gang members are also no longer immune from the
violence which often accompanies robberies, including
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robberies by fellow gang members. In the words of
another respondent:
"It's changed [since 1982] because the dope
-crack- has got everybody runnin' around
with their head cut off. Your own homeboy's
turning against you- shootin' you, killin'
you for it, for the drugs. Especially the one's
that's using it. They kill you."

Gang Migration
. Against a backdrop of escalating violence, declining drug
prices, and intensified law enforcement, Los Angeles area
gang-related drug dealers are seeking out new venues to
sell the Midas product- crack cocaine. According to
Frank Storey, head of the FBI's field office in Kansas
City, Mo., Bloods and Crips "have set up crack operation
there and in 45 other cities, including Tulsa, Omaha,

In fact, it appears difficult to
overstate the penetration of
Blood and Crip members into
other states.
Denver, and St. Louis."14 These operations have also gone
beyond urban areas. As a recent New York Times
headline proclaims, "Drug Gangs Are Now Operating in
Rural States." 15
Our research this summer confirms such reports.
Respondents claim to have either participated in or have
knowledge of Blood or Crip crack operations in 22 states
and at least 27 cities. 16
In fact, it appears difficult to overstate the penetration of
Blood and Crip members into other states. As one Blood
respondent put it:
"They got homeboys ... you know, Crips? ..
It's got to the point where they're in every
state now. Nine times out of ten, when I get
out of town, I know somebody that's out
there."
A Crip respondent corroborated this observation:
"Everywhere you go, you know what I'm
saying, anywhere you go, you're gonna see
some people from L.A. If they got, you know,
a dope house out there, or a dope street out
there, you gonna see somebody ... you 'II run
into somebody on that street from L.A."
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Further, every respondent that belongs to an L.A. area
Blood or Crip set reports either travelling themselves or
having knowledge of individuals in his set that do.
This finding has led us to conclude that travelling or
going "out of town", as it is commonly referred to by
gang members, has become an intrinsic part of the
decisional fabric of the L.A. drug business. That is, just as
drug dealers decide whether to "curb" sell or "house" sell;
to have partners or sell alone; or to sell "weight" or just
rock, they also decide whether to migrate or stay put.
It is difficult to pinpoint precisely when migration became
an institutionalized aspect of drug dealing. The recent
Justice Department report on the expansion of crack
operations into rural states dates the phenomenon as
beginning in 1988. Among our respondents, one reports
having travelled to several states as early as 1981-82, but
of course, he was selling cocaine as powder. A more
accurate estimation, based on our interviews, suggests
that the most ambitious and skilled drug dealers may have
started as early as 1985, but most didn't begin untill98687.

This development appears to have had a significant
impact on African-American Los Angeles gangs.
Travelling to sell drugs is one more indication of the
transformation of gangs from a 'cultural' orientation to an
instrumental or entrepreneurial orientation. Or as one
respondent explained:
"Back in the earlier days, you know, the
values of drugs was never overriding the
values of gangs."

Why Travel?
Like an object poised between a closing door and a
magnet, Los Angeles area gang members experience push
and pull pressures to abandon the streets of Los Angeles.
What pushes? Competition is one factor. It is widely
reported that the Los Angeles area drug market is either
already saturated or fast becoming so. 17 With a reported
gang membership population of 80,000, it is easy to
understand why and how competition would reduce crack
prices in Los Angeles. A respondent describes the
economic pressure:
"There's competition, man. Like, say I'm
selling my ounces for, like seven fifty. Man,
I'm making a killing. This motherfucker
comes from L.A., you know what I'm saying,
with ounces for five fifty. You know what I'm
saying? And then ... and probably his double
prices 'blow up dope,' you know what I'm
saying? B-12's, you know what I'm saying.

But still, man, they go to buy that shit 'cause
it's cheaper, you know what I'm saying? Next
thing you know, everybody ... trying to sell
at five fifty, I'm going to lower my prices
down. You know what I'm saying. Or, you
know, like, I'm giving out a big five 0 sale.
And my five 0 is big. And he come with a
bigger five 0 .. So I got to bigger mine, you
know what I'm saying?"
One respondent offered an overabundance of supply
explanation for lower prices:
"Four ounces gonna cost you on street value
today, like $2,500. Back then, four ounces
would cost you like three or four thousand
dollars. [Why has the price come down?]
Because it's so easy to get now. It's coming
in so much large quantity that everybody's
gettin' it, everybody wantin' to make they
money, you know."
There is no doubt that the street price of cocaine in Los
Angeles declined dramatically between 1988 and 1989. In
1988, we reported that the price of a kilo of cocaine had
fallen from $50,000 to $60,000 to $12,000. In the late
summer of 1989 the price apparently declined to between
$9,000 and $10,000 per kilogram- this despite
heightened law enforcement activity at every level of
government. Price reduction has made drug markets
outside of Los Angeles much more attractive. As one
respondent commented:
"Out of town where nobody else ain't at ...
that's where the money's being made because
there's too much competition in Los Angeles.
It's got too many dope dealers in Los Angeles
competing against each other. So they take it
out of town. The profits are better. Here you
can sell an ounce for $600, over there you can
sell it for $1,500."
If competition serves as one of the propelling factors,
intensified law enforcement is another. When drug selling
in a neighborhood becomes too extensive and too visible,
a concentrated police response is often the result. One
respondent describes gang member perceptions of and
reaction to a police response:

"Probably my neighborhood would get hot or
something like that, you know. The law
would be death on the neighborhood. They
just crack down and come like every other
day ....just make a whole sweep and just take
everybody to jail. You know all the time you
look up and see the police. You can't be in
that neighborhood without the police coming.
So you go somewhere else."

"And you go somewhere else and get that one
hot. Until you just get the whole city hot, once
you know the whole city is hot ... that the
police ain't playing, you get out of the city.
Go to another city. And then bum that city
out, just like everywhere that's been burnt
out, that's why people's going out of
California."
Of the informants who made this point, all referred to
either police sweeps or raids upon crack houses as the
major factor "pushing" them out of town. Whether other
police tactics, such as undercover buying and police
presence in a neighborhood, are also effective to the same
degree is not clear. In sum, both competition and police
pressure motivate migration. None of our respondents
suggested, however, that anyone committed to selling
drugs is about to seek out an honest job. As one
respondent summarily explained:
"You get too known, it get too competitive, it
get too hot ... a lot of police crack down.
Then again, the people just want to make
money. They say, "It's too much competition
here, hey man, let's go out, like to Iowa, Iowa
and Utah."

The Pull to Travel
The pull to travel is best understood as a pursuit of higher
prices allhough there are other advantages to travelling
which will be discussed later. Ultimately, the draw is
simply the flip side of the declining street value of crack
in Los Angeles.
"The gangs are gettin' bigger, they gettin', I'd
say, more sophisticated to selling drugs ...
They expanding their organization out of
town. First it was just in the L.A. area and in
their neighborhood. Now they takin' it out of
town because there's more money to be made
there."
As this respondent suggests, areas adjacent to Los
Angeles and other cities in California18 generally, early
experienced the effects of this pursuit of higher prices.
Two respondents related their experiences in these areas:
"[Describing condition in 1985] In Lancaster
you make more money. It is better to go to
L.A. to buy your drugs and then go to
Lancaster to sell them."
"You can charge a lot more, you know, like
when I went to the San Fern~do Valley, what
they was charging for $50, you know what
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I'm saying?, I'd give it to them for $20 [in my
neighborhood]."
This condition is now duplicated in out-of-state drug
markets:
"I can come out [t]here, you know, cause they
might sell a twenty dollar rock . . . a twentyfive dollar rock ... small, real small
compared to what we might sell out here. We
might sell it bigger than what they sell it out
there. We can go out there and double our
money ... See, the dope out here ... is, like,
lower ... than the dope out there."
"You go to Phoenix ... like, with a rock out
here that I would sell for $25, I'd go to
Phoenix and make it sell for $50."
Apart from the higher prices that Los Angeles area gang
drug dealers can exact from out-of-town markets, they
maintain four additional advantages when they migrate ..
1) They can exploit a reputation for violence thus
diminishing threats from local out-of-town drug dealers
Two respondents explained the attitude that local dealers
take towards Los Angeles visitors:
"Because other cities, they consider L.A. a
crazy city which it is. You know what I'm
saying? ... Like Chicago, like cities with
gangs not like us, they look at us like, 'you
motherfuckers is crazy', ... you get a lot of
respect."

.. they see the news, and they
think everybody going to come
out here and shoot them up.'
"Out there you not going to get into it with
anybody from L.A., especially South Central
L.A., because, everybody knows what goes
on, or they see the news, and they think
everybody going to come out here and shoot
them up."
2) Los Angeles travellers perceive themselves as enjoying
accesses to more resources- money, firepower and skill
- than local competitors. Respondents offered the
following comments regarding this advantage:
"We faster than they are, we from the city,
see. So they would have to watch us first,
because we knew what we were doing. It's
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like if a business-person were to go to a
slower town and start up a business putting
computers in. They had to learn from us."
"They [local dealers] couldn't do nothing.
They're too slow. And if there are any of
them that got heart and that want to stand up .
.. Well, we got some on our team that are
straight killers that will kill."
3) Los Angeles travellers have access to larger quantities
of cocaine than local dealers. One respondent described
the out-of-town drug market in the following way:
"Out there [Minnesota], it's quick to sell, it
didn't even take us a week [to sell 7 kilos].
We sold by the ounce, the quarter key, the
half key. The dealers from out there started
buying from us."
4) Los Angeles travellers have developed more
sophisticated arrest avoidance techniques than local police
usually encounter. A respondent gave us an example of
one technique he used while selling in Las Vegas,
Nevada.
"The police was trying, but they couldn't do
nothing about it [drug sells]. They got some
police out there called 'nasty boys', they wear
all black. You can't see them coming unless
you really look out. So we said, 'yeah, that's a
slick idea.' So we got to wearing all black so
they couldn't see us, so they didn't know
what was going on."

Stay at Homes
Despite the compelling inducements and the many
advantages gang members enjoy when they do migrate,
many gang members travel only selectively, within
California, or not at all. Respondents indicated four
reasons for declining to sell drugs outside Los Angeles:
1) Foreign Prisons. Respondents discussed the quality of
prison life. They fear doing time in prisons outside of
California. In California, gang members already retain
ties to inmates, while they do not in other venues. As one
respondent put it
"I'd mther go to jail here than go to jail way
up there [in this case, Seattle, Washington]."
But this fear goes deeper, expressing the danger of being
in any prison without commdes. The respondent
continued:

"They [inmates in other states] arc gonna fuck
with us ... They've never been to Los
Angeles County. They got them hinky, hanky,
mothcrfuckers up there, man. Fucking kill off
my fucking ass or something, man."

They fear doing time in prisons
ouside of California.
(2) Sentence Severity. Respondents fear that in some
other states and in the federal system, sentences will be
higher than they are in California for comparable
offenses. Some states merited explicit identification. "I'd
hate to get caught in Texas or Alabama or Mississippi
with a cocaine charge."
Others were opposed to travelling regardless of the
destination:
"That's dangerous, you're talking about a lot
of time. And if you just do it in California
you're cool."
(3) Distance from Friends and Family. Respondents
expressed a fear of the unknown, of leaving the security,
familiarity and recognized relationships of the
neighborhood. One respondent, discussing others who
declined to leave the neighborhood, addresses their
timidity in somewhat disparaging terms:
"They is addicted to the 'hood, you know
what I'm saying? They don't want to leave
home ... move away from the 'hood, you
know?"
Other respondents explain their disinclination to travel not
so much as timidity, but as caution in anticipation of the
dangers of the unknown; as well as a lack of confidence
in those who claim to know the dangers of the outlying
territory:
"I ain't never been nowhere. I don't believe in
going out of town. I be thinking something is
going to happen to me. I just stay in an area
that I know about."
"I always wanted to be around my 'hood ... I
want to know where I can run to. I don't like
following a motherfucker hoping he knows
where he is going, I want to know where I'm
going."
(4) Satisfaction. Some respondents report that some gang
members are satisfied with the income derived from

current drug selling operations in Los Angeles. Almost all
consider traveling, but don't feel that the pressures
warrant the risk associated with travel.

Making the Move
Whatever the pressures to leave the comfortable environs
of Los Angeles and strike out to sell in unfamiliar venues,
travelling usually does not commence following anything
like a formal meeting and strategic planning by informed
associates. According to our respondents, all inclinations
to travel of course begin with the expectation of acquiring
income, even wealth, from the new local drug trade. But
these are the travels of provincials, not cosmopolitans.
The expectation of unaccustomed drug income offers
many of them their first opportunity to travel outside their
neighborhood, city, and state. Indeed, the idea of selling
drugs out of town may be activated from ordinary
extended family visits to distantly located relatives:
"A family member probably say something,
like you know ... 'Drugs is out here' ... they
got drugs here but it's not a lot of drugs, like
out there in South Central."
As the operation expands it usually becomes more
sophisticated, depending on actual market opportunities,
plus the skill and ambition of the gang member who
'discovers' it. Generally, the longer the travelling
phenomenon continues the more sophisticated it becomes
as Bloods and Crips begin to develop an extensive
network of contacts in cities and counties throughout the
nation.
Among those who do decide to travel, plans are usually
made according to the network of the individual planning
to migrate and the word on the street about the potential
of a market. That is, most of those who venture out of
South Central choose a locale either because a trusted
homeboy is already on the scene or he hears from a
trusted homeboy that money can be made out there. The
former mode is illustrated by a respondent who describes
his introduction as follows:
"Yes, I had people who was already out there,
already knew the ropes and shit, you know,
what's going on, and shit, because if you just
go out there and you don't know a damn thing
you'll go to jail quick."
Three respondents reported that they choose an out-ofstate destination based upon what they had heard on the
'street'. One of them illustrates the conversation as
follows:
" 'Hey, what's been gain' on homeboy? I
been out here and here .. .' 'what's been
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goin' on out there?' ' ... There's money out
there.' 'Where about?' And he tell me ... "
Or they were recruited to sell drugs for someone else out
of town:
"Well my homeboy tell me ... one of my big
homeys come over there and say, 'Yeah, I just
got this spot from this, you know, base head.
You know, we got a spot over there from a
base head.' So we go over there and make
money."
Occasionally, risk accepting homeboys who arc feeling
the heat or the competition in South Central decide, like
immigrants seeking a promised land, to venture
somewhere, anywhere, that seems to promise economic
opportunity and adventure. One reported that he had been
selling in Arizona. Did he have connections there? His
answer:
"Nah, we just got on the airplane. Paid them
the money, went out and got on a airplane.
[You didn't know anybody, have any prior
information?] Didn't know nothing. Just
looking for, you know, the dope ... the dope
smokers, you know."
Although the homeboys arc in one sense, provincials, in
another they are sophisticates. They know the culture of,
and feel comfortable within, the confines of an inner
city's drug dealing world. If a homeboy has neither
contacts in a particular city nor information about the
nature of its drug market, he often understands how to
scout it out:
"We went out there and got our own area. We
had to peep things out first. There's ways to
go about it. Got out there, get with some girls
or something, talk to girls, find out
information; girls done talk, you know. You
got to know how to do it."
"I went like on a scouting mission. Me and
two other homeboys, check it out. We'd go
down there with all the flash, you know, my
big homeboy would have all the dope, all the
money. He'd get us down there, we'd lease a
Corvette or Mercedes or something, you
know, we have all this jewelry and the flashy
clothes and the loud sound in the car and we'd
just ride around different high schools. And
people, say like in Kansas, they see that and
they like 'Oh man, you know they from LA,
they from LA, from California' and they
come to you."
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"You meet [a] girl and you get in good with
her ... like there's been cases where we met a
girl, got in good with her, let her hold money
for you and stuff, let her see how there's
money ... and then, you know, you're selling
dope out of her house, or she's selling dope
for you or she tell you where all the dope
spots is, you know, she's telling you who's
who in that town, you know, and then you get
yourself established. She's glamorized by the
car, the jewelry, the money, you young,
beepers, you know, they used to see beepers
out there and just go nuts."
Once the expansion decision has been made, the issue
shifts to the potential hazards posed by illegal drug
transfer. Few respondents counted occasional
transportation of drugs across state lines as being
extraordinarily difficult. But those who transported drugs
on a regular basis invested considerable thought and
energy into avoiding capture. One respondent mailed his
cocaine to a P.O. box or an address, since police were
using dogs at airports. Others usually drove or flew with
or near the drugs to the out-of-state locale. Tactics to
avoid arrest varied. Those who drove to the new venue
might employ the following:
"All right, in the car, we had the back scat
made, so you could pull it out and put the
drug there ... We pack it in regular plastic,
then in tinfoil, then in a vacuum-packed bag
that's supposed to take the smell out, so the
dog can't smell it."
"In the Benz, there's this hole, but I put
powder there. I rock it up when I get there.
Then I take it in the first aid kit in the Benz,
put it in the headrest, put powder up there
where the zipper is. Put it in the door panels."
Those who flew to new venues employed other tactics.
"We had it like this: the guys would dress
ordinary ... like off the street. The police got
hip to us. So we started dressing good- the
fancy clothes, the big jewelry - so the police
would get us and the girls would go through.
The police would say 'hey, you're drug
dealers' and hassle us; the girls would dress
ordinary and get through."
"That worked for a while, then the police
started getting hip to it. So we got white girls .
.. We go up to Hollywood. If the girls liked
us we'd start talking to them: "Hey, will you
do us a favor?' ... girls our age ... they'd do
it ... we'd pay them $500-$600. They'd do it
for the money."

"Eventually the rumor was, don't usc the
airport, they taking everybody's money. So
we [then] started taking the bus ... I be
scared to get on the bus, but that's part of the
risk. She sit up in front, I sit in the back, just
like that. She get off the bus, get in cab. I
already gave her the address. She was paid up
front."

In one gang, members had established out of town spots
in five cities. They then began pooling their money
together:

As the remarks of the above respondent illustrate, an
elaborate and well conceived transportation plan must be
developed for most ongoing crack operations. Drugs must
be dispatched to the new market and proceeds returned to
Los Angeles. One group of travellers began training their
runners or couriers:

Operations such as this are well-organized, low profile,
and if possible, non-violent. These characteristics,
exhibited among high level dealers are also manifested
among more casual travellers. In particular, efforts to
maintain peace with other Los Angeles gangs and local
drug dealers, and low profiles with regard to law
enforcement agencies are shared by all travellers,
irrespective of their ambition and sophistication.

"Most likely the runner be a female, an older
woman, in her thirties. We'd have a woman,
and she'd have to get trained- I guess you
would call it trained - we just told her how
to do it, then she would do it if she wanted to .
.. We was paying our runner $9,000-$10,000
a month."
Through these various methods our respondents were
transporting as little as an ounce to as much as six to ten
kilos a month to cities in Nebraska, Missouri and
Louisiana.
Once there, crack operations varied in quantity of drugs
sold, frequency of visits, and nature of selling (e.g. curb
selling vs. house selling). Typically, Los Angeles area
gang members will adopt the same selling practices as
locals. Thus, in Detroit, travellers generally sold out of
houses, while in Minnesota travellers sold at the curb.
Eventually, at the high-end, these operations, advantaged
as they arc by modern communications technology, can
become quite sophisticated. As this occurs, they come
more closely to resemble the organized crime model. One
advanced drug entrepreneur describes his operation as
follows:
"Every house I ever had I [went] about it in
the same way ... I hire anybody- Bloods,
Crips, Hispanics ... I had different people in
different spots ... What I used to do, I used to
just kick back and ride around, spend time
with my wife and kids. I got a beeper, okay,
you know, with a beeper service. I got a
beeper that's, you can be in Cleveland and get
beeped from out here [Los Angeles]. It's what
you call 'round the world' beeper, one for LA,
one for all around. So ... if I had to go do
something - pick up some money or
something, or take someone stuff out therethey'd just call."

"All the homeboys put all their dope together,
and send it like that; then all the money come
back and then it's how much everybody
should get ... "

Taken together, these characteristics may represent the
'New Rules of Drug Dealing.' In sharp contrast to the
rules prevailing in Los Angeles, Bloods and Crips arc not
interested in gang banging with one another or with locals
when they are out of town.
"As for that Crip and Blood thing, that's not
going on outside of town."
"Everybody trying to keep a low profile.
Everybody like, 'there's enough out here for
everybody. Just don't step on nobody's toes'.
We never got into it. It's all about money;
money come first. You can gang bang
anytime."
Indeed, gang members will leave a locale rather than risk
conflict with another set, even a rival.
"If we go to Louisiana, another set can come
to Louisiana, but they can't come to the city
we at, they have to go to another city, they
have to be far away from us ... If you go out
of town, and you a Crip set and there another
Crip set, then you have to move out; that's
respect. If we go out to a state and there's
Bloods out there, then we choose if we want
to leave or not. But most likely we'll leave
because we don't want to be shooting a fight
with no others, in no different state, because
we out there to do one thing: make money ...
We're out there to sell drugs not for the
killing."
These instrumental values implicit in the "new rules of
drug dealing" are not easily apparent to younger gang
members, who are used to the traditional Los Angeles
gang rules. They, in effect, need to be resocialized to
understand and conform with the emerging
entrepreneurial goals of distant markets.
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"But sec out there you got these 16 and 17year olds want a name for themselves ...
Some of them that went out there with me
want to know 'where the Bloods at? Where
the slimes at? Let's go get off on them.' I
said, 'I'm not goin' nowhere, I'm not showing
you how to get around out here ... I ... care
because it bring the heat on me if they do
something outside a one of my houses."
In some instances, gang members do not merely avoid
inter-gang fighting, but report active cooperation.
"Sec like Chick (a Blood), he was calling the
shots out there (Minnesota), with the Crips
too. I ain't going to lie, he was like calling the
shots, but we had like our own little section
and shit. We stayed out they way, they stay
out our way. They apartment was next door,
right next door, to us and shit, you know, ...
They stayed in they little corner and we
stayed in ours, we stayed out their way."
The same deference that Los Angeles gangs display
towards one another also applies to locals, provided the
local dealers don't attempt to resist Blood and Crip
intrusions in the drug market.
"Once we get outside of town we not thinking
about trying to kill one another. Everybody
trying to have money. Once we get out of
town that's the thing- we got to be together.
In an environment we don't know nothing
about. What about these local assholes, we
got to watch out for these assholes, we don't
know about them ... But then again, all we
got to do is find one dude from that area, and
we get to know him and he put us up on a lot
of things on that area."
"We didn't came up there to fuck with no
gangs or nothing. We came out there to make
our money to get on about our biz, we ain't
come out there [to gangbang] because that's
how a bunch of shit gets started. You go out
there with a gangbanging attitude, you won't
never have shit. You 'II get killed ..."
This more purposively rational attitude also applies to
avoiding notice and identification by the police; Los
Angeles gang members will alter their dress when out of
town in an effort to be less conspicuous.
"We don't go out there all ganged ... We,
like, wear casual, like, corduroys, you know,
little T-shirt or some little hat, you know, and
that's it."
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Dealers make efforts to avoid police and especially to
avoid areas which have a reputation of stiff law
enforcement and sentencing.
"People don't want to go to Texas, because I
heard when you go to Texas, you hang ...
You really won't catch anybody that will go
down, down South, because if you get caught
here you will only spend time."
"They wanted to go to L0uisiana, I was, like,
'you crazy.' Won't get me to go to no shit like
that man. That's real man. That's the way I
see it."
These "new rules", however, are or will be challenged by
several developments. These developments arc: the
saturation of out-of-town markets, imitation of Los
Angeles gang structure by youth in out-of-town drug
markets, and increased law enforcement effectiveness as
locales begin to share information and techniques to
combat gang migration~
Perhaps foremost of these developments is a perception of
tightening of competition in out-of-town markets.
Whether this is attributable primarily to an increase in
supply -or to a reduction in demand- is difficult to
estimate. In any event, one respondent reported:
"I went to all of them [Cleveland, Kansas
City, Tacoma, Las Vegas, Indianapolis,
Milwaukee, Alaska, and Texas] ... I was
making a lot of money, but it got to the point
where, the dope dealer call it 'this body
gettin' burnt out'. Right? There's too many
people out there, you know. And the one's
[customers] that's coming to you ain't comin'
to you no more. The money that was comin'
to you ain't comin' to you no more. It's still
there but you got to be patient to get it."
The possibility of renewed hostility grows as out-of-town
markets tighten. These are unstable markets serviced by
young men who know how to respond violently in
situations where they perceive challenge or "disrespect."
One respondent offered the following observation on how
easily gang hostilities can begin.
"When I go out into another state and shit, I
let the niggas know right here I'm from
Compton because I got tattoos all over me, so
it ain't shit I can hide, So I tell them you
know, 'I'm from Compton Crip man, I ain't
coming out here to disrespect you, you all just
giving me my respect' ... I ain't going to say
'fuck you all set' because I don't want them

to say that to me and shit. But if they say that
shit, you know it could start a gangbang. All I
do is make one phone call, call my cuz, call
some of the homeboys, they'll come out and
see what's going down. Then the gang shit
starts."
In terms of duplication, we can only speculate on the
probability of mass proliferation of gang formation and
identification. One respondent related the following
incident to us about the reaction of local youth to his
presence in their neighborhood.
"They was young and shit, you know, they
wanted to be in a gang. I used to try and tell
them ... man it's too late to join [a] gang, that
shit is old now. They still don't want to listen
to me, so I said 'fuck, all you got to do is go
fuck that nigga up and shit and you're in the
'hood.'"

Gang Organization and Migration Patterns
The willingness to assume risk is not the primary
difference between Northern (entrepreneurial) and
Southern California (cultural) "gang" related crack selling
operations. And as Bruce Johnson et. al., have pointed out
"inner-city minority youths working in the illicit cocaine
economy are selling their labor, sales skills, and
willingness to risk very substantial prison penalties. The
willingness to take such risk is the only service which
middle class persons value and pay for [when buying
drugs]."t9
A more important distinction is in organizational
structure. The Los Angeles cultural gang is horizontally
organized while the Northern California is vertically
organized. The only purpose of Northern California
"gangs" is to facilitate profitable criminal activity. The
distinctive features of these gangs are: 1) members
consider them a business organization; 2) the business is
drug dealing; and 3) as a consequence, the use of violence
is limited to intentional and directed towards protection or
promotion of business interests.
In addition, we observed the structure of such
organizations to be vertical. There are three elements of
vertically organized crack operations.
First, one person usually controls the supply of drugs to a
turf. As one respondent put it: "There's always a big man
somewhere around. As far as being in a dope gang,
there's always a big man." Several respondents referred to
specific turfs as being run by one or a small group of
individuals. One respondent reported playing such a role
in his turf:

"I was passed the torch from my brothers, as
far as leadership. I have some O.G. (Original
Gangsters) homeboys, but they in jail.
Everybody in Hunter's Point (San Francisco)
pretty much listens to me. I had that respect
coming to me from my brothers, and I had it
coming to where I could say 'we goin' do
this, that.' "
Second, this person determines who can sell drugs in a
turf, that is, he determines in an organizational sense,
membership. According to one respondent:
"The whole Acorn (in Oakland) don't get
along. Now it's different. [When] Larry P.
was running the whole Acorn, we didn't fuck
with him. Larry P. was like 'Man, tell your
fool, I catch you down here, you or any of
your boys down here selling some more dope,
fool, and it ain't any of mine, I'm going to
break arms or whatever.'"
And third, within the organization, several roles are
created and filled on the basis of age and expertise. One
respondent described his introduction and matriculation
through an organization.
"Around ten, that's when they started liking
me, hooking me up. I keep their dope on me
when the police come and shit like that.
Gradually I got hooked up and I started
selling dope for them, my older partners, my
OGs. And then I grows up and my little
partners, they look up to me. They started
getting hooked up with me. And it goes on
and on like that."
While the above sounds relatively efficient, the vertical
structure of most crack operations generates competition
within the organization. There are only a limited number
of "spots" at each level of the organization. As a
consequence, distrust, betrayal, and sometimes violence
occurs among members.
"In Oakland ... , when you in the dope game
you can'treally trust nobody, you can't trust
nobody; even you motherfucking brother ... I
started feeling I couldn't trust him [his father]
and he couldn't trust me. Even though he was
my father, we was blood. Then came the point
when I was getting so big on my turf and he
was hearing about it and I was crossing so
many of his partners that he had people come
and jump me. So you really can't trust nobody
in the dope game."
One respondent reported ripping off fellow turf members
to rise up. In general it seems a truism that "The next man
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is try in' to come up off the next man." Indeed, one
respondent reported:
"I didn't want to get that high up. I done seen
too many folks be called big dope dealers,
die. They feel like they kill him, they can
move up. It's tight to get up there. You need
to do a lot of stepping to get up there."
This intra-turf competition poses serious problems for
those in leadership. Typically, two methods are employed
to maintain the leader's authority. The first involves the
provisioning of rewards for members, such as drugs,
· luxury items, or clientele. As pointed out in our previous
report, "the fealty of membership depends on the
opportunities offered by leaders, usually those who can
claim a reliable connection to a source of drugs. ''20
Members are also rewarded with clientele. According to
one respondent, "My big partners, they be tellin', like
'yea, we want you all to go to such and so house.' They
be givin' us their clientele so we could come up."
At the other end of the spectrum, authority is maintained
by physical coercion, which in extreme cases may result
in deadly violence. One respondent who "employed" 30
or so people described how he maintained fealty.
"They [his little partners] be trying to come
up for themself. But we didn't play it like
that You worked for me or you didn't work
for nobody. You get caught buying some
dope, you better buy it from me. They were
like sneaky little motherfuckers though. They
make their little money and then they go buy
like two ounces from somebody else, while I
get another count."
"[What would happen if you caught them?]
They get fucked up. They ain't going to get
killed, but they'll get beat up. Take their car,
take their jewelry, slap their bitch in the face,
spit on them. 'Get on fool, why don't you get
with another group. You can be as dead as
they are.' They like 'that's okay man.' They
be scared to leave.''
In sum, vertically organized crack operations generate
intra-turf competition, which sometimes results in
violence. This occurs both as low-level dealers attempt to
displace higher level ones, and horizontally, as "the next
man tries to come up off the next man.''
This competitive attitude extends to rival crack selling
operations and is the primary cause of violence. As our
respondents reported:
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"[We] fight over money, turf.''
"There's violence in a way, because some
people, they have little spots. 'Only my
people sell here, you'all can't sell here.'"
"Gangbanging for the people of the Bay Area
isn't really like Los Angeles- it's a little turf
dispute. What we're fightin' over is money
and power ... I wouldn't say it's
gang banging."
As we reported in our earlier research, "the frequency of
instrumental gang violence depends on territorial
stability. "21 One respondent described what occurs when
territorial stability is compromised:
"That's when it really started gettin' deep.
They were coming by, driving by and
shooting and so were we. That started
because, you could say, at the time, and now
at the present, Hunter's Point is fightin' for
control of the drug game in San Francisco.
Fillmore was like wasn't goin' for it. They
didn't want this to happen because, if it was
to happen Fillmore wouldn't be making that
much money. That's why it's still pretty much
the same as far as the drive-by shooting and
all the killings. It's because Hunter's Point
almost got control of the drug trade in San
Francisco."
According to another respondent, what is at stake in turf
wars is who gets most of the money. This respondent,
after detailing how the Fillmore turf took over the
Sunnydale turf, asserted that Sunnydale dealers were still
making money, but "they were selling dope for the next
man."
The picture of Northern California crack selling
operations outlined above may be summarized as
business-like, hierarchal, and dependent upon the liberal
use of coercive mechanisms against both internal and
external competitors.
By contrasting this state of affairs in Southern California
we will be able to see the distinctive effect that cultural
gang organization has upon the structure of crack selling
operations. This effect helps to explain why Southern
California drug dealers migrate and Northern California
drug dealers do not. As the cultural features of Southern
California gangs persist, so, likely, will migration. 22

Southern California Gangs: The Horizontal

Structure Explored
Northern and Southern California "gangs" do not deal
drugs differently. Both employ curb and house selling
techniques to distribute their product. Both rely on
violence to protect their "market share" and guard against
rip-offs from desperate crack users. However, the
attitudes and behaviors that Southern California drug
dealers hold towards members of their own gangs are
markedly different than those of their Northern California
counterparts.
Southern California gangs instill in members trust,
loyalty, and identity. In many ways they serve to create
whole individuals and thus play an important role in the
lives of members regardless of whether they sell drugs or
even actively remain in the gang. Many respondents
described what the gang gave them:
"Well a gang, it like gives you something, it
gives you something on the inside. You feel,
when you join a gang, you feel like
somebody. Especially in South Central,
people feel like if you not a movie star or a
professional sports player, you not nothing.
And it's too hard to start a business, like
Famous Amos or somebody. If you not a
movie star or something like that, you not
nothing. So a gang, it like gives you
something. You hanging out with the fellas;
you accepted; you somebody- it gives you
something on the inside."
"It's like a family to me, they like brothers.
The attention, the name, the glory. To escape
reality from my family ... to seek adventure.
.. to find something different in life."
"[Why do people join gangs?] Just to be in,
you know what I'm saying ... just to be part
of something."
Further, drug dealing within the gang is optional.
According to our respondents;
"[Gangs] didn't have nothing to do with
selling no drugs. That's just something you do
on your own. You straight gang bang. You
ain't got to get into the drug deal, you know."
"They say it's peer pressure to get in a gang.
It ain't peer pressure to get in no gang. It ain't
peer pressure to sell no drugs either. If you
decide you gonna sell drugs, you gonna sell
drugs."

Finally, Southern California gangs don't have leaders.
"There's never a leader ... A gang, you
know, is just a group of people. They just
hang together and nobody tell nobody what to
do."
"There's not really one designated leader.
You just all together. If a person has an idea,
or suggestion, then we look into it. Follow
through with it. But there's not a designated
leader."
"There was no one person that called the
shots on everybody. But there were several of
my homeboys that was older than us that
usually set the pace for us."
The implication of course, is that the structure of the gang
is more horizontal. People still "come up" in the drug
trade and within the gang, but this occurs not as a
consequence of competition with other members, but with
age, experience, and knowledge.

Conclusion: A Theory of Gangs and
Gang Migration
Although gang migration has attracted governmenf3 and
media24 attention, it still remains opaque. One explanation
is that the desire for greater or renewed profits motivates
dealers to travel to other states. This presupposes a
transfer of drugs from "old markets" (i.e., Los Angeles,
San Francisco, New York, Miami, Philadelphia) to "new
markets" (i.e., Seattle, Phoenix, Kansas City, St. Louis,
Tennessee). While probably correct, this line of reasoning
doesn't answer why do some "old markets" generate gang
migration and others don't?
Nor does an explanation grounded in the skill and focus
of law enforcement. That line of argument implies that
Los Angeles police are more effective than those in San
Francisco and Oakland and the target cities; and that New
York and Miami police treat Jamaicans differently than
indigenous African Americans. There is little evidence to
suggest that is the case. Police in all cities we have
studied have evolved and are developing a variety of
sophisticated enforcement structures -buy-bust teams,
neighborhood police units, tactical units, undercover units
-to address drug selling. Gangs everywhere try to avoid
police apprehension.
Arrests for selling crack have increased dramatically in
New York City, from 3,000 per month in 1986 to 6,000
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per month in the fall of 1988.25 Similar figures can be
found in Los Angeles, Miami, San Francisco, Kansas City
and Seattle. Street drug sellers experience law
enforcement pressure all over the country.
As the rise in arrests and enhanced police activity was
occurring, the price of cocaine was perceptively dropping
in all of these cities. According to Terry Williams, the
price of a kilo in New York fell from $60,000 in 1980 to
$20,000 in 1988.26 A similar price decline is chartable in
San Francisco where a kilo sold in 1989 for $12-$13,000.
So street sellers also experience market pressures. All of
tJ,ese- the increased number of drug dealers and the
increased supply, the decline in price, the pressure of law
enforcement- all serve to encourage travelling to "new
markets."
At the same time, migration seems to occur mainly among
Jamaican, Haitian, Dominican and African-American
street gangs in Los Angeles. 27 And only Jamaicans and
Southern California gangs apparently travel regularly to
the midwestern United States. Both the Dominican and
Haitian operations appear to be regional, albeit large
markets. Why should that be?
We conclude that the cultural and structural organization
of gangs, rather than law enforcement or market
pressures, offers the most compelling explanation of why
members of some gangs migrate while others do not. Los
Angeles crack selling operations appear to be horizontally
organized (although this may be changing). San Francisco
gangs, on the other hand, are vertically organized. And
according to Williams and Johnson, New York's crack
operations are also vertically organized.
These two different stmctures of crack dealing express
conspicuously different values- one promoting trust and
loyalty among equals, the other promoting competition
and deadly ambition within a local hierarchical structure.
Horizontally organized cultural gang structures, we
conclude, furnish the individual gang member with
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resources - access to source of drugs, confidence, belief,
courage, attitudes toward risk - all of which facilitate
venturing into new marketing territories.
As Southern California gangs move into new territories
their adventuresome and entrepreneurial members
implicitly recognize that their operations do not permit the
continuation of the cultural gang values so familiar to
them in Los Angeles. South Central remains the base, the
home territory, and its values cannot be routinely
transported along with drugs. Likely, that is because the
gang was not initially organized to sell drugs. Still, those
values and understandings offer support. Thus, the data
from our interviews suggest that symbolic values implicit
in the "cultural" gang support drug marketing migration
while, paradoxically, "purposive-rational" entrepreneurial
values do not.
Neither the Northern nor Southern California gangs are
comparable to the La Cosa Nostra. If we compare these
drug selling gangs to the "mafia" we see similarities and
differences. By identifying itself as La Cosa Nostra (our
thing) the Mafia generates and attempts to enforce
symbolic interactionist norms of identity and loyalty,
while at the same time implementing a vertical table of
organizational authority. But these gangs, depending on
whether Northern or Southern, enjoy either cultural
resources or vertical organization, not both.
Is it likely that they will evolve into Mafia-like
organizations? The Northern California gangs do not
seem to incorporate the cultural grounding for that kind of
development. And the Southern California gangs seem to
rest on norms of horizontal organization which would be
difficult to overcome. Nevertheless, an innovative
Southern California leader might understand how drug
selling has undermined some of the gang's normative
base, but not so much as to make it inoperative. Such a
person might figure out how to combine the cultural
grounding of the gang, with the efficiency potential of
vertical organization. Should that happen, a Mafia-like
organization might develop in Southern California.
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DRUGS, GANGS, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Illegal drug trafficking is unquestionably the criminal
justice system's highest priority and most intractable
problem. From a practical perspective, traditional criminal
law concerns- degrees of homicide, robbery, theft,
fraud, justification and excuse - the nuts and bolts of the
common law and courses in criminal law, pale by
comparison.
What is the connection between crime and drugs? There
is of course a tautological link. Violations of the drug
laws are themselves crimes. In 1983, around 20 percent of
felony arrests in California were for drug law violations.
By 1988, that figure had risen to 30 percent. 1 But there is
more than a tautological connection. A 1989 National
Institute of Justice's Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) study
found that surprisingly large percentages of persons
arrested for serious street crimes test positive for drugs. In
New York and Chicago 78 percent and in San Diego 80
percent of those arrested for burglary, larceny and assault
were found to have ingested illicit drugs in the previous
48 hours.2
These statistics are consistent with the findings from other
data bases. Thus, the California Legislative Analyst's
Report on lhe 1990-91 Budget, after analyzing National
Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) Household Survey data,
the California Department of Alcohol and Drug
Program's (DADP) estimate of problem drug use; the
Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) data as well as
DUF and the California Drug Abuse Data System (CALDADS) concludes that the drug using population
comprises two distinct groups- "casual users whose
numbers have been decreasing and heavy users whose
numbers have been increasing. "3
The DUF data show that street criminals are among the
heavy users of drugs. It does not follow, however, that
most drug users commit street crimes. That inference
would of course be illogical. It would be similar to
inferring falsely that most alcohol users are reckless
drivers from a finding that most reckless drivers were
under the influence of alcohol.
The correlation between drugs and criminality raises more
questions than it answers: Do career street criminals
commit crimes to satisfy an addiction? Do others commit
crimes because they arc under the influence of a powerful
drug? Or are drugs a recreational activity popular among
people who commit street crimes? And does it much
matter? I suggest it docs from both a jurisprudential and

social policy perspective. If drugs are regarded by street
criminals as just another expensive commodity -like
furs or leather jackets- then whatever punishments we
impose on other criminals should apply equally to those
who use drugs.
But if street crimes are being committed largely to finance
an addiction, or in reaction to the drugs effects, then
lengthy prison terms make little moral or practical sense.
Those who arc addicted will be disposed to commit illegal
acts to satisfy a craving for the drug. Moreover, to the
extent that addiction limits freedom of choice, addicts
may be less deserving of punishment.
Given the extraordinary relationship between drugs and
street crime, it is hard to believe that drug addiction docs
not play a major causal role in motivating such
criminality. One scholar, after reviewing the quantiL:'ltivc
information produced by government agencies, clinicians
and medical researchers, concludes that the majority of
cocaine users consume only sporadically, while addicts
generate the greatest individual and collective demand. 4
This perception is supported by NIJ/DUF interviews
where arrestees are asked if they need drug or alcohol
treatment and to specify the type of treatment needed. The
percentages who request treatment vary from city to city,
from a high of 41 percent in Philadelphia to a low of 11
percent in Houston. Most of these requests are for cocaine
treatment, although in five of the 16 cities, more than onethird of those requesting treatment said they were hooked
on hcroin. 5
Criminal justice statistics also suggest that addicts rather
than casual users of drugs arc those who are committing
crime. Contrary to the popular impressions presented by
the media, criminal justice statistics show a decline in
victim crime such as robbery and burglary since 1980. In
1980, the U.S. robbery rate per 100,000 was 251. By 1987
it had dropped to 213. The burglary rate was 1 ,684. In
1987, it dropped to 1,330. 6 Since reported robberies and
burglaries seem to be declining; and since most of those
arrested for those crimes arc drug ingesters - but by no
means most of the drug ingcsters - it seems reasonable
to assume that drug addiction rather than use is a major
cause of crime.
What is the relation between heavy cocaine use and
trafficking? Arc these largely overlapping populations or
arc they separate? Our seller interviews suggest that,
unlike heroin sellers of an earlier time, they are largely
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separate populations; that is, those who sell drugs are
mainly illegal entrepreneurs who are selling not to
maintain a habit, but to earn money. For them, the
opportunity to market the drug is valued highly, so highly
that they will fight and even kill to maintain market
control. As a result, drug trafficking has become
increasingly associated with both street violence and the
decline of neighborhood civility.7
r:inally, the prevalence of drug selling, itself a felony in
every jurisdiction in the United States, surely undermines
the accuracy of estimates of the amount of felonious
crime in this country. Criminologists have traditionally
identified two sources of error in crime statistics. One, the
so-called "dark figure" of crime, addresses the limitations
of the Uniform Crime Reports and refers to crimes
undisclosed to police. Since many victimizations are not
divulged to the police, these statistics, gathered in the
Uniform Crime Reporting System, substantially
underestimate the kind and amount of criminal
victimization. The National Crime Survey attempts to
correct for this distortion by asking people to report their
victimizations to survey researchers rather than the police.
Crimes which arc undcrrcportcd to the survey researchers
arc sometimes said to constitute the "double dark" figure
of crime. 8
There is also, however, a "triple dark" figure involving
consensual but felonious crime. At the white-collar level,
this may include bribes and kickbacks. Still, drug sales
must far outnumber these, and by how much we can only
guess. The triple dark figure of crime may be our most
elusive crime statistic. Its magnitude can only be
suggested indirectly by the huge amounts of illegal drugs
confiscated by law enforcement authorities9 and the
complaints of local citizens complaining and reporting a
sharp rise in neighborhood drug selling.
In sum, ailhough burglaries and robberies appear to have
declined in the past decade the public has not become less
concerned about crime. Why not? Obviously, it is because
both the actual and perceived violence associated with
drugs and gangs has become a major area of public
concern. As reports of gang migration from Los Angeles
to other cities become increasingly evident during 1989,
communities outside of Los Angeles became increasingly
concerned about the invasion. It seemed worthwhile to
study law enforcement responses to gangs and their role
in the drug dealing picture.

Police Strategies
In 1989, I spent two weeks in Kansas City and
approximately one week in Seattle, Los Angeles and New
York interviewing and where possible participant
observing with police and prosecutors. Police officials in
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all of these cities reported that drug distribution was their
principal criminal justice problem, although in Los
Angeles the gangs themselves, and inter-gang violence,
constituted an independent public safety problem. Two of
the cities, Kansas City and Seattle, had experienced a
significant "gang" migration problem and were therefore
selected as sites to observe.
Neither city's police force could claim a "solution" to
eradicating drug dealing from their cities, although each
was able to increase arrests and to apply pressure to drug
dealers. I observed in Los Angeles because it is the locus
of the migrating gang members; and New York- which
had not been invaded by West Coast gangs. In all of these
cities, police were actively struggling to counter the drug
problem with a variety of tactical approaches. In what
follows, I shall report on my observations and interviews
with police in each of the cities, although I shall focus
mainly on Kansas City and Seattle, since these were the
principal responders to the Los Angeles gangs outside of
Los Angeles. I shall try to summarize the most innovative
features of these approaches and then discuss the
structural conditions - beyond the control of police and
prosecutors- which limit the effectiveness of drug law
enforcement in controlling drug trafficking.

The Problem
In his 1988 Annual Report, Kansas City Chief Larry
Joiner points to "the increase of violent crimes associated
with the influx and use of crack cocaine" as the major
crime problem facing the Kansas City Police Department.
This increase in drug trafficking is attributed to "a new
challenge for the department- the infiltration of Los
Angeles gangs." As in other cities, Kansas City employs a
variety of drug enforcement tactics which I observed
during my two visits over ten days. These included buy
bust operations, observation arrcsLs, warrants served on
crack houses by a full-time team and specialists in
community involvement. But because I was considering
drug enforcement tactics directed specifically toward Los
Angeles based gangs, in this part of the report on Kansas
City, I shall limit my discussion to the apprehension and
federal prosecution of these gang members. A similar
federal - local strategy is also occurring in Seattle.
The migration of Crips and Bloods to Kansas City should
largely be understood as a displacement-replacement
phenomenon. About three years earlier, in 1985 and 1986,
30 or 40 Jamaican drug dealers arrived in Kansas City and
successfully introduced crack cocaine. The Jamaican
cocaine connections were from south Florida and the
Jamaican dealers were able to deliver a steady supply of
the drug. The Jamaicans controlled the crack trade at
every level and were reputedly very violcnt. 10

In response to the influx of the Jamaicans, the Kansas
City Police Department set up a special narcotics
enforcement unit with the Federal Government in which
the local officers were deputized as Federal agents. This
unit was able to convict 23 Jamaicans of serious drug
offenses.
The Jamaicans were sentenced under Federal law to long
sentences- 10, 15, 25 year sentences·- with no bail.
Chief Joiner, among others, stresses that the no bail
provision acted as a major deterrent to the Jamaicans.
Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (18 USCA par. 3142)
bail may be denied when there is a serious risk that the
accused will flee; or will threaten or intimidate potential
witnesses; or will be a danger to the community.
Since the Jamaicans were reputedly violent, were
financially well-to-do, and had a place outside the U.S. to
flee to, it was not difficult for the Federal prosecutors to
persuade the Federal judges to deny bail. As a result,
whenever a Jamaican drug dealer was charged, and later
convicted, he remained in custody from the time of the
arrest; and, once convicted, was imprisoned for lengthy
terms. According to the local police, Kansas City came to
be known among the Jamaican drug dealers as a "Black
Hole," because once arrested and convicted, a dealer
would not see the street again for long years. As a result,
the flow of Jamaicans to Kansas City was substantially
reduced or stopped; or they were far more circumspect in
their dealings and especially in their violence. After the
convictions, there were few, if any identifiable Jamaican
homicides. But the relative absence of Jamaicans did not
result in the end of drug commerce in Kansas City. In the
summer of 1989, the Department's Jamaican specialist
believed that Jamaicans were distributing drugs in Kansas
City, but from a much lower profile. The vacuum left by
the Jamaicans was filled by Crips and Bloods.
Kansas City, of course, is in the Midwest, and its nonindigenous drugs must be supplied from some other place,
either from Florida or New York or Los Angeles, some
other place in the United States where drugs are imported,
processed and sold. In 1989, the narcotics officers I
interviewed estimated that the majority of the crack
cocaine in Kansas City - perhaps 60 to 70 percent originated in Los Angeles. This is of course only a guess.
As with the triple dark of crime, the amounts brought in
and the source of the cocaine traffic can only be
estimated.
Why did Los Angeles gang members migrate to Kansas
City? The explanations offered by the gang members we
interviewed in prison and the Kansas City narcotics police
were entirely consistent. Kansas City was not selected as
the result of a strategic decision or a marketing survey.
Although drug distribution demands a degree of
organization- surely a legal "conspiracy"- it is not

that well organized. The Crips and Bloods who migrated
to Kansas City operated in a world of kin organization
rather than an overarching criminal organization. Those
who migrated had friends or relatives, informal social
connections in both cities.
Major David Barton, Kansas City's narcotics chief,
described one convicted drug dealer as typifying the
pattern. When "Jones" had been in the Marine Corps, he
had been stationed near his LA relatives, with whom he
became increasingly friendly. He adopted the LA
lifestyle, had a cousin- "Brown"- who was an
original gangster. They, but not the "gang," recognized
the potential for profit in the Kansas City market - that
they could sell drugs in Kansas City for at least twice the
price of what comparable drugs might sell for in Los
Angeles.
"Jones" and "Brown" were typical in another sense. One
was a former Marine, the other an original gangster.
These are not youthful gangbangers. The Crips and
Bloods who transport drugs from Los Angeles are people
who are older than the typical gang member. They are
young men in their 20's who have survived gang-banging,
who arc original gangsters, quite savvy and experienced
in criminal activities and in dealing with and usually
avoiding the police.
When they first arrived, they and their gang associates
exhibited their colors, and graffiti appeared in various
neighborhoods. The police believed that this was a
strategic move, an effort to mobilize local youngsters
impressed with the aura of the Los Angeles gang. It was,
in a sense, a way of expanding the values and loyalties
prevailing in the Los Angeles gangs to Kansas City.
But the tactic partly backfired. When drug dealers wear
gang colors or use graffiti, they bring unwanted police
attention to themselves. Rational drug dealers try to
deflect police attention and so the show of gang symbols
has diminished. Nevertheless, graffiti do appear and kids
who sells drugs on the street do sometimes call
themselves Crips and Bloods. But these are usually not
California kids. They are Kansas City youngsters, "wanna
bees" who are using these symbols as a way of marking
out their turf and of showing some identity with Los
Angeles gangs.
At the same time, the actual Crips and Bloods supply
Kansas City with a regular supply of drugs. In Kansas
City, the Crips and Bloods are generally inconspicuous,
very quiet. When they are arrested, their original domicile
is traceable through their social security number, which
identifies region of issuance. Occasionally, but rarely, a
California Crip or Blood will sell drugs on the Kansas
City strceL<>.
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Police do not discern a pattern to all of this. As one of
them said, "When they leave California, they're either
tired or maybe they're fearful of being killed in LA, or
they just come out freelancing. We've seen graffiti from
the 69th Street Crips and the Inglewood Family Gangsters
in Kansas City, but it doesn't mean all that much." At the
same time, the title of Crip or Blood is said to enjoy a
positive association among Kansas City street drug
dealers. The Crips and the Bloods arc known to be
capable of murder. That association and that reputation
intimidates potential competitors.

Law Enforcement
Certain key features of police work and of prosecution
involved in apprehending and convicting interstate drug
dealers are worth stressing: (1) that these Crips and Blood
cases- as well as other cases involving middle and
upper level dealers - required infiltration by undercover
police of what is usually a conspiracy; (2) that every drug
offense is potentially a Federal case. Because these cases
involved interstate shipments of substantial amounts of
cocaine (the largest seizure was ten kilos) the cases were
considered appropriate for Federal jurisdiction; and (3)
Federal drug, sentencing, and bail statutes are highly
disadvantageous to defendants in drug cases and are not
necessarily "typical" of drug enforcement in Kansas City
~tnd (4) that the mechanism for Federal- local policing
was initiated in response to Jamaican gangs including
persons identifying themselves as Muslims as well as
Crips and Bloods.
So the challenge of the Los Angeles gangs was responded
to by developing increasingly cooperative investigations
between the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Kansas City
Police Department, headed by Major David M. Barton
and various federal agencies, and coordinated by the
United States Attorney in the Western District of
Missouri, particularly Assistant U.S. Attorneys Linda
Parker and Peter Ossorio. As a result of these
investigations, 26 cases involving Crips and Bloods gang
members had been submitted as of May 24, 1989 Y In 17
of these, convictions had already been obtained; and the
remaining were either being charged, appealed, or the
accused was a fugitive.

But the enforcement pattern is similar. Undercover agents
work their way into the mid-level hierarchy and police the
gangs or any drug organization similarly. Although the
gangs arc thought to bring most of the crack cocaine to
Kansas, other local drug dealers still maintain sources in
the East and South. Typically, then, police do not target
gang members. They target mid-level drug dealers who
often but by no means always turn out to be LA gang
members.
Although undercover policing cannot be directly observed
by an ethnographer, as warrant service and search
procedures can, it is possible to review undercover tape
transcripts and to interview undercover officers. Two of
the most successful undercovcrs in Kansas City are
Detectives Mary Brown and Donald Birdwell. Both know
Kansas City well, arc street smart, know how to make
drug deals and to reassure dealers that they are not police
- the first concern of the dealer.
"Targeting," according to Mary Brown, is the first task of
the undercover officer. Mary Brown explains:
"I target my subjects. When I target an
individual I look for people who are
associated but beneath him ... You start from
the bottom and try and work your way up to
the top to get to the big fish. Then you
conduct surveillances, get license numbers,
use the computer. I'm a firm believer in using
that computer terminal, in digging out any
and all intelligence information that the
computer may have on the individual."
The undercover officer is usually introduced to the
"target" by an informant who may be enlisted by the
undercover officer, or who informs the undercover that he
has a prospect. Birdwell describes how he was introduced
to one of Kansas City's most notorious dealers, Abdul
Shakur:
"One day this informant calls up and he lays
out Abdul Shakur's operation. We'd already
done some background on Shakur via the IRS
and we'd heard about him from other
agencies. So we interviewed the caller in
person, confirmed that he had the information
and took a go at it."

Undercover Work
Narcotics police work at this level is not significantly
different from traditional vice squad enforcement, but
with more resources, partly because local drug
enforcement is more highly supported than it was in the
1960s; and partly because the Federal connection offers
both more resources and a potentially higher penalty
structure.
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Birdwell's "go" resulted in three taped conversations in
which Shakur incriminated himself into what, with other
evidence of a drug conspiracy, became a life sentence
without possibility of parole. In one of these
conversations, Shakur offered to sell Birdwell (disguised
as Big Damon) as much as a kilo of cocaine, to "rock" it
up for him, and to advise him how to conceal the profits
through real estate purchases. Shakur's assurance that his

cocaine is of the highest quality was clearly recorded by
Birdwell. Shakur, the dealer, says:
"That's one thing I like to do is keep good
quality stuff and then you can deal with the
people fairly because it's good. It ain't they
smoke it up and they don't feel nothin'. It's
gone in 2 or 3 minutes. You see what I'm
saying, they get mad then ... Keep your
customers happy. 'Cause they're the ones
spending the money man."
The undercover officer experiences a double problem. He
or she must appear to be enough part of the drug dealing
community to be credible. But she also has to develop
new appearances. Mary Brown does this well. She
describes "working" subsequent drug houses of a major
dealer who "had dope houses set up every place ... Each
time I'd go in and work on his dope houses, they'd bust it,
and I'd move on to the next."
Didn't they get to know you?" I asked.
She replies:
"No. I wear curlers in my hair. I change the
color of my eyes with contact lenses. I wear
different wigs, nail polish, jewelry- or I
may not wear makeup at all ... It depends on
who I'm dealing with. Ifhc's a slickster, and
likes gold, I put rings on every finger.
Sometimes I use a southern accent, and say
I'm from Houston. My main problem is
always to remember how I looked the last
time I saw the dealer. One time I forgot which
color eyes I wore last time. So what I did was
put my sunglasses on. He never questioned
me on that."
The information provided by the undercover officer is
used to invoke the first step of the conviction process,
which is to establish probable cause for a search.
Assuming that the search will produce illegal drugs and
possibly, guns, the accused will be taken into custody.
U.S. Attorney Linda Parker describes drug enforcement
as "run and gun" investigations in contrast to long-range
complex investigations that are sometimes conducted by
the FBI.
Long-term investigations arc valued by Federal
authorities but on the whole are not considered
appropriate for drug dealing, even where wider range
conspiracies are thought to exist. Long-term
investigations may be more successful because
undercover buyers can work their way up the
organization. At the same time, as buys arc made, the
dealers remain active and "in place." Criminal activity is

permitted, thus generating a dilemma for law enforcement
authorities. The longer the investigation endures, the more
successful it might be- but the more crimes will be
committed by the perpetrators. In general, drug selling is
regarded as so serious, authorities try to remove drug
dealers as expeditiously as possible.
Once a Federal arrest is made, drug dealers rarely if
every qualify for bail under the Federal guidelines. It is
not difficult to convince a Federal magistrate under a
complaint and a motion for detention that a drug dealer,
found with a sizeable quantity of drugs and guns, is likely
to ilee or to pose a danger to the community if returned
there.
The prosecutor is required to present for indictment
within 30 days of the filing of the complaint. The
indictment is presented to the Grand Jury with, in effect,
all of the charges. The Grand Jury will hear the
appropriate witnesses against the accused, but since
neither the accused nor his attorney is present, there is no
cross-examination. Rarely, if ever, do Grand Juries fail to
bring an indictment in a drug case. The trial date will be
set for no less than 40, nor more than 70 days following
the return of the indictment. Given the terms of the
indictment, an accused can contemplate what his sentence
will be, if convicted under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines before the trial.
The Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual is a complex
"grid" system which offers little discretion to the
sentencing judge. Under it the sentence is determined by
the offense level, on the left side of the grid, and the
defendant's criminal history on the right. A mid-level
dealer caught possessing 2-3.4 KG of cocaine is a level
28. Criminal History Category's range from I through VI.
Someone with a IV criminal history and a 28 level offense
is looking at a sentence of 110 to 137 months, with no
parole. Should that person have been found with
possessing a gun, two offense levels would be added,
resulting in a sentence of 135-168 months.
Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198612
while the guidelines were being developed. This Act
effectively restricted the commission's discretion in
establishing guidelines for drug trafficking offcnses. 13
Thus, the Guidelines arc even more severe if the cocaine
has been processed into crack. Possession for sale of half
a kilo of crack will bring a sentence of 15 to 20 years.
And under the Federal statute there is no parole, although
"good time" is available to the convict.
Plea bargaining is said to be rare in Kansas City since the
introduction of Federal Guideline sentencing. Judges have
little discretion and Justice Department policy offers little
discretion to prosecutors who are advised to support the
Guidelines. Prosecutor Linda Parker observes:
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"Right now we're seeing a lot more trials than
we did a year and a half ago. I imagine that
will change because people tend to get used to
whatever is around for awhile. Right now
everyone says there's no benefit to plea
bargaining and you might as well go to trial.
They're still remembering the benefits before
the sentencing guidelines went into effect.
Once they've forgotten those there might be a
return to plea bargaining."
The trial still disadvantages many defendants. In addition
to the usual problems faced by defendants -appearance,
revelation of past criminal record if they testify, the
possibility of perjury- during the trial the defense
attorney is not allowed to inform the jury of the size of the
penalty, e.g., "If you find my client guilty, she will be put
away for 25 years." Thus, in the Shakur case, he, the
principal drug dealer, was sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole. His wife and his girlfriend were
charged as part of the conspiracy and were sentenced to
20 and 25 years. Whether a jury, or even a prosecutor,
would think them deserving of such punishment is open
to question. Under the guidelines, such penalties are
prescribed by the Congress, and the judges have little
authority to change them.

The Criminal Sanction
Do such severe penalties as the Sentencing Guidelines
impose for drug trafficking make sense? That depends on
one's theory of the criminal sanction, and where drug
trafficking fits into it. Presumably, such penalties deter
potential dealers. Doubtless they do. The question may
not be whether they deter, however, but rather how much
additional deterrence is drawn out of each additional
month of sentencing and whether mandatory minimum
sentences make sense.
Are traffickers familiar with the guidelines, other than to
know that stiff penalties await the convicted dealer? Do
dealers calculate finely as between 90 or 120 months?
Based on our interviews with dealers, it seems unlikely
that dealers make fine calculations. They know that
penalties arc stiff, and they develop tactics for avoiding
them- not always successfully, or they would not be in
prison to be interviewed. Mandatory minimum sentences
may make sense insofar a'\ they send a "tough time"
message to potential drug traffickers.
At the same time, traffickers seem motivated less by the
threat of penal severity than by the commitment to selling
drugs. Like commuters who are daily faced with the threat
of accident and injury, but arc committed to working,
drug dealers "absorb" the potential threat of penalty. It is
likely that an individual who has been imprisoned will
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experience some deterrence in the future, should he be
released. Yet amounts for sale arc more likely determined
by market opportunity and norms of the drug trade than
by a careful assessment of the federal penalty structure.
Our interviews with police suggest much the same- that
in the face of severe penalties dealers will take more
precautions, be less blatant in making sales, less violent,
operate with a lower profile. Should that happen they will
be less publicly intrusive, but likely more elusive. As
Detective David Starbuck, the Kansas City Police
Department's Jamaican "specialist," commented:
"There was kind of a lull here in 1988
because we really stepped hard on the
Jamaicans after they arrived here in 1985. At
that time, what they were doing is bringing in
dozens of young kids- Jamaicans, illegal
aliens - out of Miami and New York to be
dope house workers. We were frustrated, we
would raid these houses and get nobody
except the bottom of the ladder people."
"More recently they've kind of changed their
tactics and they're more involved in
wholesaling quantities of cocaine to mid-level
dealers ... They have established enough
contacts with mid-level dealers where they'll
come in here and wholesale their product and
then be out."
It is hard to say what the effect of the heavy Federal
penalties has been. A recent article in the San Francisco
Chronicle suggests that gang infiltration of American
cities has been growing rather than diminishing, despite
the best efforts of police and prosecutors to eliminate the
drug tradc. 14 According to this article, some communities
are experiencing the culture of gangs -"with its secret
world of nicknames and hand signs, fierce territorialism
and violence over the color of shoelaces" -as an even
more dangerous problem than the drugs exported from
Southern California.

This article and our own research in Kansas City suggest
that these "gangs" are actually not Southern California
gangs but local youngsters who model themselves on
Southern California gangs. At the same time, Southern
California gang members arc the wholesalers and
sometimes mid-level dealers who distribute drugs to the
local sellers. Clearly, those who market the product are
advantaged when locals identify with their gang
affiliation. And equally clearly, committed drug dealers
arc willing to accept the risk of imprisonment as a cost of
doing business.
If the threat of long prison sentences does not seem to
significantly deter drug dealers, especially perhaps those

associated with Los Angeles gangs, from distributing the
profitable product, is incarceration effective?
Theoretically, incarceration should be effective because
drug dealers cannot distribute drugs while they are
imprisoned. As an anti-crime strategy, the theory depends
upon two assumptions: one, that high level dealers will
not be involved with street selling while they are in
prison; and, second, that there is a relatively short supply
of replacement dealers.
The first assumption is probably true. We did interview a
high level dealer in Northern California imprisoned for a
parole violation who claimed that he continued to make
the major decisions for his gang while he was imprisoned.
Nevertheless, incarceration must have some impact on an
individual's ability to function as a leader. The second
assumption, of non-replacement, is far less sustainable.
We know that gangs continue to operate after their leaders
are imprisoned. Not only that, we also know that street
violence may arise when gang leaders are imprisoned.
Incarceration thus may have the paradoxical effect of
generating violence, with little impact on diminishing
drug selling.
A "just desert" rationale is probably the most sustainable
justification for severe sentences. Yet even that rationale
is questionable. If we regard penal sanctions as moral
judgements, they arc rather like a ratio scale. When we
think of common law crimes such as burglary, robbery,
rape and homicide, we immediately recognize that they
form such a scale. That is, we intuit that a robber
"deserves" to be punished more severely than a burglar,
and so forth.
Do we have similar common intuitions about the relation
between burglary and the sale of half a kilo of crack
cocaine? I suggest that we do not. Difficult as it is to
intuit the relative deserts as between classical victim
crimes and drug trafficking, an even more difficult "just
desert" question is posed by the penalties attached to
trafficking in different amounts and varieties of drugs. For
example, under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, any person who
distributes, or possesses with intent to distribute, one
kilogram or more of a mixture or substance containing a
detectable amount of heroin, or five kilograms or more of
a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
cocaine, is subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment. 15
But why should we consider these to be equally
deserving? Arguably, the distribution of a kilogram or
more of cocaine is more socially destructive than the
distribution of a kilogram of heroin. The Federal drug
penalties may seem appropriate to some, inconsistent to
others, and needlessly severe to still others, particularly if
their deterrence value is relatively slight compared to the
cost they impose on the Federal taxpayer.

How do we measure the effect of such severe penalties as
mandatory five- and ten-year sentences on the drug trade?
I asked undercover officer Donald Birdwell that question
and he replied:
"I think we have to measure our success by
what the prices are on the streets. If we're
holding the line, then prices will stay up.
We've seen (summer, 1989) an eighth of an
ounce of cocaine - that's called an eightball
-go from $350 to $200. The more we are
saturated the lower the prices. I'd say we still
have a lot of work to do."
"What kind of work?" I asked. "People ask me if I have
any solutions. What would you say?" He answered:
"It's obvious who they are using to distribute
the cocaine. They're mostly using poor black
youths. You have to present them with a
different alternative or method to make a
viable living. You've got some kid living in
the projects who doesn't have anything, no
food to eat and he learns that he can make
$200 a day selling crack cocaine on the
comer, he's going to do it. So is the older guy
who's got kids at home whose only
alternative is a minimum wage job at
McDonald's. The public has to be made
aware of the importance of presenting
different alternatives ... The only thing we
can do is try to stop the demand, attack it on
that front, and present alternatives to those
that are likely to become involved in selling
drugs."
I asked what he thought of "boot camp" sentences of 90
days for first time or small time sellers. He replied:
"That won't solve the problem either. I have
seen it happen here where if there is a group
of five sellers, and we arrest four, the fifth
will continue to sell. If there's one left, and he
doesn't have any alternatives, he's going to
continue to sell cocaine. Arresting may be a
temporary solution, but I don't think it will
greatly diminish cocaine trafficking."
Our interviews with police in Kansas City and elsewhere
suggest two sorts of attitudes being expressed. One, that
police cannot be held responsible for solving the drug
problem in the local community or in the United States.
At the same time, police often express pride in their own
work, or the work of the department. This is certainly true
in Kansas City where the Department takes pride in its
resourcefulness and professionalism, while recognizing
that drugs are freely available in some sections of the city;
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and that, despite the best efforts of law enforcement,
prices declined in 1989. It is also true in Seattle.

Seattle
As a west coast city, Seattle is perhaps even more
vulnerable to gang migration than midwestern cities.
According to police chief Pat Fitzsimons, the crack
phenomenon and gang migmtion began late in 1986 or
early 1987, when police began to make arrests of
California residents. They discovered, by checking on
them, either that they were recognized by California
police as being gang members, or that they were
associated with California gang members.
These arrests were not necessarily for drug dealing. Some
of the arrests were for disorderly conduct. Several
California dealers had moved in with Seattle women and
were arrested on charges of domestic violence. Both
police and press began to identify this as a movement of
Los Angeles gang members to the Seattle area. And the
media began to run series on "invasion" of the Los
Angeles gangs.
This sort of media attention typically offers a double
message: one prong deplores the rise in drug dealing, its
negative impact on the community, and the need for
community awareness; at the same time, media attention
publicizes the gangs and their significance, particularly
among youngsters who might be inclined to sell drugs.
Chief Fitzsimons estimates that there were in Seattle at
least 500 "gang members, their associates and people who
look like gang members who were not on the California
gang files." The Chief, however, distinguishes between
the migrating group who are "older" by which he means
in their early 20's, versus the local "kids" who are legally
"juveniles," that is, below the age of 18.
The local gang is called the BOD's (Black Gangster
Disciples). They are not, however, considered to be the
middle level dealers. Much, perhaps most, of the crack
cocaine is smuggled into Seattle by Crips and Bloods. But
police informants reported that drugs are increasingly
being purchased, even by LA gang distributors, from the
Yakima, Washington area where there is a sizeable
population of Mexican Americans and Mexican nationals.
The cocaine moves from central America, through
Mexico, to Yakima - and from there passes into the
Seattle area.
Just as in Kansas City, genuine Crips and Bloods
characteristically will not identify themselves to the
police. "If they say they are, they ain't" says an
intelligence officer. But among some local youngsters,
there is a cachet to seeming to be a member of a gang.
Gang affiliation is said to offer a sense of status and
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identity. "They're not academic and they're not athletic,"
says Chief Fitzsimons. He continues, 'They're looking
for something they can say about themselves and gain a
little status - but the real operators are not going to
broadcast who they are, what they are, or what they do."
And he adds, just as did one of the gang subjects we
interviewed in prison, when we asked about gang
affiliation outside of Los Angeles, "The color is green,
money."
The Seattle Department responded to the drug trafficking
infiltration of California gangs in several ways:
First, the Chief, who is sensitive to the importance of
public and police coalitions for reducing neighborhood
crime, and especially drug dealing, has created citizen
advisory boards in each of four precincts. The main
program is the South Seattle Precinct's Police/Community
Crime Reduction Pilot Program, implemented in January,
1988. The idea is to work with members of the
community to identify crime problems- especially those
arising out of illegal drug selling in the neighborhood.
The project, according to Chief Fitzsimons, was "the
result of many meetings and great effort to focus the
concerns of the community and the limited resources of
the Department on the local impact of a national epidemic
and proliferation of illegal drug use. " 16
The community advisory boards grow out of the two
ideas that have become increasingly prevalent in United
States policing in recent years: community-oriented
policing and problem-oriented policing. 17 In keeping with
what have by now become traditional communityoriented policing ideas, the Department initiated
committees to address a number of issues: business and
block watch, community contact and support, vandalism
and special projects, the development of volunteers. South
Seattle residents were especially encouraged to join the
block/business watches, and to report illegal activity
through an anonymous hotline staffed by members of the
South Seattle Council.
Two of the residents, Jean Vcldwyk and Norm
Chamberlain, were recently cited by William J. Bennett as
"national heroes" in the "war on drugs." "They," wrote
the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
to Chief Fitzsimons, "are living proof that uniting with the
police and fighting the drug problem can restore these
seemingly dismal places to health and safety." 18
As an illustration of problem-oriented policing the police
department rearranged patrol staffing so that more than
two officer cars were available for proactive patrol in the
area. In addition, the Precinct Commander was afforded
additional resources in equipment and personnel,
including a four officer "Anti-Crime Team" to address
specific crime problems as these arose in the area. One of

the more publicized innovations has been a 21 man
mountain bike patrol who brave the hills of Yesler
Terrace, a subsidized housing complex. The police
department says that open drug dealing and gang activity
have dropped in areas patrolled by the bikes. 19 The South
Seattle area reported a 7.1 percent reduction in crime from
1987, as compared with a 1.3 percent increase among the
other three precincts during the same time period.
Second, in addition to community-oriented and problemoriented policing, the department emphasizes crime
prevention with juveniles.

bunch as a criminal gang. You want to avoid
calling a football team a gang."
Members of the gang unit work with school officials,
truant officers, and families of youngsters who appear to
assume a gang identity. A related intelligence unit
identifies persons, many of them not juveniles, as gang
members or affiliates. Thus, the anti-gang unit maintains a
wall with a visible photo gallery identifying such persons.
Finally, the unit will send out a team of ten or 12 officers
to monitor and contain gang activity in the
neighborhoods. I spent an evening riding with and
observing such a team.

The Chief says:
"We want a lot more done with schools, with
truants, with programs that might help
families and kids. The emphasis is on
mobilizing all the local resources to say that
this is my responsibility. We want to identify
the kids who are at risk with the assistance of
school security people and counselors."
"The message we will try to bring to the kids
is their own accountability for their actions.
These kids are trying to gain respect, but the
message we want to bring is that there are
certain things you cannot do, and you will not
gain respect if you do them. We will treat you
as an individual, and help you as an
individual, with your individual needs. But
we will not do anything to build up the
importance of your group or gang. And I
strongly oppose recognizing your gang and
assigning a social worker to it."
The emphasis on juveniles is partly embodied in a
proactive anti-gang unit. Called the Coordinated Criminal
Investigations squad, the unit started officially in 1985 in
response to an Asian gang massacre where 13 Chinese
victims were hog-tied and shot in an after-hours gambling
club. The unit, initiated primarily to monitor Asian gang
activities, expanded both its size and jurisdiction in 1985
to include police problems arising with Samoan and
Philippine groups. Lt. AI Gerdus, who heads the unit,
comments:
"Whether they (the Samoan and Philippine
groups) were legitimate gangs is a debatable
issue. By most standards they wouldn't be,
but they were ethnic groups that were running
together and were occasionally involved in
criminal activities." He adds, "Identifying a
gang is a complicated business. Where does a
social group tum into a criminal gang? Where
is the magic line of demarcation? You have to
avoid identifying a bunch of kids that run
together and sometimes fight with another

When a researcher moves from the interview as a research
tool to participant observation, things happen. Concepts
like "proactive," "gang" and "gang affiliated" become
infused with reality - which, in practice, means
uncertainty. When I began to practice participant
observation with police nearly 30 years ago, I coined the
concept of "the symbolic assailant." I wrote:
"The policeman, because his work requires
him to be occupied continually with potential
violence, develops a perceptual shorthand to
identify certain kinds of people as symbolic
assailants, that is, as persons who use gesture,
language, and attire that the policeman has
come to recognize as a prelude to violence.
This does not mean that violence by the
symbolic assailant is predictable. On the
contrary, the policeman responds to the vague
indication of danger suggested by
appearance. •'20
The police of another era were concerned primarily with
burglars, robbers, and rapists. Recall Officer McFadden,
the legendary Cleveland plainclothes detective, whose
observation that "crime was afoot" when he observed
three suspects casing a jewelry store, led to the landmark
decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The officer,
whose observations led him to believe that the suspects
were planning a stickup, asked Terry to identify himself.
When Terry only mumbled something, Officer McFadden
spun Terry around and patted his breast pocket.
McFadden felt a pistol, which he removed. The officer
frisked Terry's companions and uncovered another pistol.
Terry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, and
moved to suppress the evidence on grounds that he was
unreasonably searched and seized.
Chief Justice Earl Warren deferred to the expertise of the
experienced officer and authorized police to "stop and
frisk" when they do not have "probable cause" to believe
that a crime has been or is being committed, that is, to
make an arrest; and to use evidence obtained from the
frisk.

29

However ambiguous traditional criminal procedural
concepts like "stop and frisk" or even "probable cause"
may be, they are grounded in situations described in
cases, and are continually being retested in the courts. But
the activities of a proactive anti-gang unit are not so
constrained, particularly if the objective is not necessarily
to arrest, but t.o be a presence in the community. In this
situation, the prevailing norms for police conduct do not
derive primarily from the Fourth Amendment and cases
interpreting its sometimes arcane clauses.
The norms are those communicated partly by
management cops, partly by understandings within the
unit itself, and partly by a few of the more aggressive
officers within it. The norms governing the unit's purpose
and operational style were not entirely clear. The Chief
viewed the unit as a community- and problem-oriented
policing unit. A mid-level officer, speaking informally,
described the unit as quite different from a narcotics
enforcement unit, which develops informants, makes buys
and serves narcotics search warrants. It was described
instead as follows:
"It is proactive on the streets. Inside the
department it is informally called the B-team
because it deals with black gangs on the
streets. And it uses an in-your-face approach
to these gangs."
Here is what my notes and recollections show that this
was an :tccurate description of the unit's approach. The
notes say:
Several black teenagers are standing on a
street corner outside a neighborhood grocery.
One of them is holding a brown paper bag.
The officers I am riding with, one black, one
white, stop the car, take away the bag (it
contains an unopened can of beer) and frisk
the young man. He is ordered to kneel on his
knees, with his hands behind his head; then to
remove his sneakers and socks, turn his socks
inside out. His ID reveals that he is 19 years
old, and a neighborhood resident. He is told t.o
go home and not to return to the corner.
Similar searches are made by the same group of officers
of other black teenagers. One group is gathered around a
bench in a public park. They are similarly instructed to
kneel, remove shoes and socks, aggressively questioned
and searched. No weapons and drugs are found, although
one of the young men who was searched possessed a
beeper and $200 in cash- strongly suggesting that he
was involved in dealing drugs.
When I interviewed the police about the tactics I had
observed, they believed that they were carrying out the
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mandate of the unit - which was t.o "harass" teenagers
congregating on the streets in areas where drug dealing
gangs were thought t.o operate. When I asked the Chief
about the tactics, he was visibly concerned, and attributed
the tactics partly t.o a misinformed understanding by the
rank and file in the unit as to the unit's mandate, and in
larger part to the over-aggressiveness of some individuals
assigned to the unit.
However one interprets these observations, several things
are clear: first, patrol policing has always offered
enormous discretion to the individual officer or to groups
of officers working together. This discretion is informed
by the officer's values and understandings of the nature of
the job. During the 1960s and '70s police departments and
individual police became increasingly sensitized to inner
city needs and demands for even handed enforcement. In
part, this resulted in the community-oriented policing
movement.
But the rise of crack dealing in the late 1980s has
complicated the whole issue of police discretion and
community relations. The organized South Seattle
community demands that the police "crack down" on the
dmg dealers and criminal gangs in general. Thoughtful
police chiefs find themselves on the horns of a dilemma.
The problem crack dealing poses for a responsive police
chief is how to effectively police the gangs - who do
exist but for whose existence it is difficult t.o draft
criminal statutes- and yet not routinely harass
teenagers, particularly black teenagers, whose only crime
is street socializing.
There is no problem in enforcing the criminal law. Police
know how to make a buy in a crack house, obtain a
warrant, search, seize evidence and convict.
Far more problematic is the mandate of a proactive antigang unit. If the mandate is to "take back the streets"
rather than t.o enforce the criminal law, such a unit may
pose a threat both to the civil liberties of individual
citizens and to police-citizen relations as a whole. If the
police are reluctant to employ such measures, many
residents will predictably criticize the police for failing to
insure the public safety that neighborhood residents often
demand. Police may succeed in deterring some street drug
dealers when they employ "in-your-face" tactics. But they
may also inflame anti-police attitudes at a time when
more than ever police need the support and cooperation of
the communities they are overseeing. In any event, the
possibilities and limitations of proactive anti -gang
policing are an important policing issue, which surely
needs more observation and discussion.

Los Angeles
The drug problem, with associated street dealing, has
spread from the inner city of Los Angeles, places like
Watts and neighboring Compton, the indigenous home of
Crips and Bloods, to the San Fernando Valley. Street drug
dealing has become a major problem in these populous
bedroom communities of greater Los Angeles, places like
Van Nuys, Blyth and Panorama City. These communities
are not the glamorous Los Angeles typically portrayed in
movies and television, not Beverly Hills, Belair or
Malibu. The San Fernando Valley is in hot and smoggy
East Los Angeles, at best a 45 minute drive from the
beaches of Malibu and Santa Monica. Houses and
apartments suggest neither wealth nor poverty. The San
Fernando Valley is a heartland residential area where a
range of ordinary people - some with families, working
people, professionals - make their home. The Valley is
the bedroom of Los Angeles as Brooklyn, Queens and
Long Island serve that function for Manhattan.
On August 11, 1989, reporter Tracey Kaplan, herself a
Valley resident, reported in the Valley edition of the )he
Los Angeles Times on an interesting and controversial
strategy for addressing the street drug dealing problem. 21
"Apartment owners along a notoriously crime ridden
street," the lead reported, "took the unprecedented step
Thursday of offering private money to increase police
patrols in their neighborhood." Five apartment owners
came forward with the money and said they could raise
comparable funds from another 30 apartment owners
along a half-mile stretch of Blythe Street between Van
Nuys Boulevard and Brimfield Avenue. That stretch has
been inundated by drug dealers who rent local apartments
and then sell their wares from the curb. Police had for two
years campaigned to crush the drug trade, but with little
success.
The story went on to report that a City council member,
Ernani Bernardi, was enthusiastic about the idea and said
that he would try in every way to get the money through
to the city council. A special narcotics task force,
composed of 13 uniformed officers borrowed from police
divisions throughout the San Fernando Valley, had
combed the area for nearly two years, and had succeeded
somewhat in controlling the drug traffic. But when the
funds ran out, the unit had to be disbanded and the dealers
returned.
"You've got a prison on Blythe Street right now, and your
guards are the drug dealers. A lot has been done to clean
up the area already, but we had to cut back when the
money ran out. These people feel that added security is
going to help them," said Councilman Bernardi.
But a police official who attended the meeting, Valley
Bureau Cmdr. Chet Spencer, was skeptical of the idea. He

praised the apartment owners and managers for coming
together to fight the Blythe Street drug problem. But he
feared that allowing property owners to donate money for
increased patrols might set an unfair precedent, since, if
enacted, such a proposal could allow wealthier
neighborhoods to buy more security at the cost of less
protection to poor neighborhoods.
A similar, but not identical, initiative arose later in the
year. Police responded to another of the Valley's "hot
spots" by barricading a 12-square block area to curtail
drive-by drug sales. The barricade resulted in some
inconvenience to residents, but they apparently felt the
cost was worth the advantage in reducing drug sales in the
area. According to another Los Angeles Times report, a
group of Sepulveda apartment owners formed a
committee to study the possibility, not only of retaining
the barricade, but of establishing a guard station at the
entrance. The City Council was faced with two issues:
should it approve permanently removing streets from
public use?; and could the apartment owners pass on part
of t11e maintenance of the guardhouse- which might
cost from $6,000 to $9,000 per month, depending on
whether the guard was armed? One of the property
owners said, however, that the cost of the guardhouse
should be borne by the taxpayers, who pay for police
services, rather than the neighborhood apartment owners,
and ultimately the renters.
Police Captain Mark D. Stevens favored payment by the
apartment owners, according to the Los Angeles Times
story. He reported that in the two weeks since police put
up the sawhorse barricades, drug traffic has virtually been
wiped out in the area. 22 He added, however, that some
property owners expressed concerns about the appearance
of the guardhouse, since the area would no longer look
like a neighborhood, not the kind of place you or I would
want to live in.
The "barricade" initiative received considerable media
attention in the Los Angeles area. This author was asked
by the Los Angeles Ti~ to offer an opinion of the
barricade idea. Rather than offer an opinion I decided to
visit the area and talk further with the police since the
barricade was both an intriguing and controversial idea,
which raised fundamental questions about the limits of
community policing.
First, it raised questions about how we as a society
properly define public and private space. Public and
private seem to be defined not by ownership, but by
norms regarding the propriety of function. Thus, the
Pentagon or an Army base, or a police station, or a
courthouse, all of which are publicly owned, clearly are
permitted to maintain guardposts to achieve security.
Those who enter may be required to identify themselves
and to be searched. But would it be permissible to erect a

31

fence around Central Park in New York City, and search
everyone who enters in the interest of security? Under
those conditions, Central Park would surely be a safer
place, but would it be a "park?" Is a neighborhood
threatened by drug dealing more like an army base or
more like a park? This seemed to be a central question
regarding the barricade initiative.
Second, even if the barricade was permissible, who
should pay for it? And especially who should pay for
additional security measures such as a guardhouse?
Should it be the responsibility of the local community
who will benefit from it and inconvenience other
members of the public; or should it be the responsibility
of the local community?
Third, what measures, if any, should a community be
forbidden to employ to increase public safety? Can it add
other security measures, such as secret cameras? Could it
exclude persons from residency based on certain social
characteristics which are shown to be correlated with
crime?
I"ourth, assuming that a barricade is effective in a given
community, what will its effect be on the larger
community. Suppose the drug dealers are driven out of a
particular 12-square block area, but they move to another
area a mile or two away? Who should determine whether
the first barricade should be allowed to continue? Should
it be the residents of the first community; or the second;
or the police? What is the obligation of the police
assigned to that community? Should it be to the interests
of the local community, or the broader community, should
those interests diverge?
These are issues on which the police obviously are
themselves divided. I interviewed Lt. Gary Rogness of the
LAPD's narcotics division stationed in Van Nuys, who
described the development of the Sepulveda barrier, and
who is himself somewhat divided on the barrier as a
tactic. Describing the area where the most recent barrier
was constructed, he said:
"Well, it's what we term a 'hot spot' down
there, we have many of them in the Valley.
That one was just getting so far out of hand.
We've tried, we have been down there in a
very aggressive enforcement posture, making
lots of arrests, not only against the dealers but
we've done operations against the customers
as well. There's a new law on the books here
in California that allows us to arrest
customers just for merely soliciting to buy
drugs. So we've really attacked both sides of
the equation, both supply and demand. That
was augmented by uniformed foot beats,
special details to go in there and have more
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visible presence and that still didn't seem to
be driving the drug dealers out."
"I think drug sales in that particular area are
almost non-existent now. But it's like, so
typical of law enforcement. You put a lot of
pressure on one particular area and it just
springs up someplace else, so now we have a
• problem three blocks over on Orion Street."
I asked him how the residents of the barricaded area had
responded. How did they feel about being
inconvenienced? He replied:
"Well, if it gets rid of the dope dealers out
there on the streets, the little bit of
inconvenience you have I'm sure is worth it. I
know if I lived there I'd like it. But it's kind
of a sad commentary on the state of affairs
right now in this country, this city where you
get to the point where you're blocking off
public streets. But if that's what it takes ... It
seems to be working."
At the same time, he stressed that although the barricade
might prove to solve the immediate problem of a
particular community or neighborhood, it created
problems for the larger residential area. He observed:
"Let's just take a hypothetical case study in
the San Fernando Valley, just the valley and
now we end up barricading every known hot
spot. OK, I've got a list of about 35 or 40 of
them. And then a month from now we fmd
out the problem has sprung up in adjacent
areas so we go and we barricade them. And
then it springs up over there and pretty soon
we've got the entire valley in this maze ...
The only real solution to this problem is to get
rid of the demand."

New York
New York City does not have a cultural gang problem but
it surely has a huge and largely intractable drug problem.
More than 1,800 NYPD officers are assigned to the
Narcotics Division, a force larger than many entire uolice
departments for middle and larger sized departments in
the United States. (fhe entire Kansas City Police
Department reports 1,136 sworn officers, while Seattle's
Police Department is of similar size with 1,148 sworn
officers.)
NYPD's Narcotics Division is primarily responsible for
narcotics enforcement, although nearly half of those
arrested for narcotics violations arc arr<.:sted by the patrol
force, who may actually be arresting for some other

violation. After the arrest is made, the officers may
discover a quantity of narcotics in the possession of the
arrested person. The following table shows Narcotics
Division Activity for October 1988 and October 1989.
The Narcotics Division of the NYPD engages in a broad
spectrum of enforcement activities, ranging from a Career
Drug Felony Offender Program, which, by pulling
together information from a variety of agencies, targets
recidivist drug distributors whose career drug activities
might otherwise remain obscure; a Drug Enforcement
Task Force, which works with the DEA to target higher
level dealers; and a Joint Organized Crime/Narcotics Task
Force, which similarly works alongside the FBI.
Nearly half the officers who work in the Narcotics
Division are assigned to Tactical Narcotics Teams (TNT).
From the NYPD's perspective TNT is an "enforcement
overlay" that contributes powerfully to the Department's
capacity to enforce narcotics laws.
Each TNT "team" is composed of 117 Narcotics
investigators, who in turn are divided into working

"modules" composed of a sergeant, five casually attired
plainclothes officers, and two undercover officers. One
functions as a buyer and the other as a "ghost" who
monitors the buyer on the street, and relays messages
back to the other officers, particularly the sergeant. This
communication is often tense. This is partly because
activities and scenes shift quickly. TNT arrests are often
made on crowded New York streets. The seller is
described as precisely as possible by the ghost, but a
corner on upper Broadway may have ten or 15 people
walking in four different directions. The police want to
focus on the perpetrator, not an innocent bystander.
Besides, undercover buying can be extremely dangerous
to the police, the sellers and bystanders should shooting
occur. I have witnessed, on a surveillance tape, an
undercover officer shoot a seller who reached for his gun
after the buyer pulled a gun, and then announced that he
was a police officer. Did the buyer believe the seller
actually was a police officer?; or did he think he was
being robbed by a drug dealer who was going to pay for
his drugs with a bullet? In a lawless setting of false
identities, how does one tell who are the cops and who are

ARRESTS

Heroin ...................... ..
Cocaine (crack) ........ ..
Cocaine (other) ......... .
Marijuana .................. .
Other drugs ............... .
Total drugs ................ .
Total non-drugs ......... .
Grand total ................ .

1988

1989

Number change

333
2,266
626
706
141
4,072
175
4,247

806
2,299
589
862
135
4,691
151
4,842

473
33
-37
156
-6
619
-24
595

Percent change
142

1
-6
22

-4
15
-14
14

SEIZURES
1989

1988

lbs.
Heroin ....................... .
Cocaine (crack) ......... .
Cocaine (other) ......... .
Marijuana .................. .

Guns ........................ ..
Currency .................. ..
SMJ executed ........... .

1
11

77
33

oz.

grs.

lbs.

oz.

grs.

13
11
9
0

250
152
220
315

1
6
174
30

7
14
12
3

320
43
36
103

1988

1989

103
$448,253
134

78
$3,749,137
103

OVERTIME HOURS
1988
Hours ........................ .

. 30,463

1989
42,985

Source: NYPD Narcotics Division Activity Report, October 1989.
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the crooks; and who are the "legitimate" crooks- buyers
and sellers who are actually buying and selling- rather
than robbers who say they want to buy or sell drugs?
Recently, in New York City, three DEA Task Force
officers were shot and one killed, while attempting to
make an undercover buy. Apparently, the drug sellers
were trying to rob the buyers, whom they apparently did
not suspect of being police.
What is the theory behind TNT? At one level, the TNT
approach to drug enforcement attacks street drug dealing
by employing traditional "buy-bust" operations. By
working with other government agencies and local
community groups, TNT teams develop a list of drug
dealing sites to explore. In some areas in NYC, as in
Washington Heights, the street drug dealing can be fairly
evident even to the casual observer. Still, TNT will
investigate citizen complaints that drugs are being sold
from a particular location. Manhattan North's Lt. Sullivan
explained TNT's function as follows:
"Our function is basically this: If somebody
walks out of their door or gets off a bus from
work and goes to walk to their house, our job
is to see to it that some guy isn't going to stuff
the dope in his face, want him to buy it; or tell
him to get lost for an hour, they're busy
selling dope in front of his house."
Sometimes reports of drug selling in front of houses can
be verified, sometimes they cannot. Drug dealers may
shift their location, or sell when they have a supply.
Selling may go on for a couple of hours at a time, and
then cease for any number of reasons. Drug dealers
cannot openly advertise their wares, they may run out of
drugs, they may decide to close down for dinner, they
may decide to move to a different location. The reality of
"buy-bust" as I experienced it riding with two different
teams is like much of police work, involving long periods
of boredom and waiting, periods of disappointment when
tips do not prove fruitful, and interspersed by briefer
periods of tense activity when they do.
But TNT aspires to be more than an ordinary "buy-bust"
tactic. On a strategic level, the team concept is area
focused. For example, I accompanied a unit working in
Manhattan North's 28th Precinct, a very small precinct of
approximately one-half square mile. The 117 officer team
will "saturate" that area for a period of approximately 90
days, arresting street dealers and those who sell out of
houses and apartments. These arrests may produce
evidence or information for a warrant search as well. As
one officer I interviewed stated: "We will effectively take
the blatant sellers off the street for a period of time."
What happens in an area when the TNT unit leaves?
Officers acknowledge that sellers return to the area,
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although perhaps fewer than were street selling prior to
the TNT "saturation." TNT officers understand that their
effect is limited, and that their presence may displace
dealers to adjoining areas. So when they leave the area,
and move on, they return periodically to continue
enforcement and to communicate to the street dealers that
the area still remains under TNT surveillance.
How effective is TNT? The program, in enhanced form, is
currently being evaluated by the VERA Foundation. The
enhancement consists of deploying a squad of 20 foot
patrol officers on the main street of a neighborhood, to
remind both the residents and the dealers of a police
presence. They are doubtless effective, and law abiding
residents and small business people are doubtless grateful
for their presence.
The question for a TNT evaluation is not whether it is
effective, but rather how it compares to alternative law
enforcement tactics. Do TNT "modules" make
significantly more arrests than foot patrolmen would in
comparably drug infested areas? (TNT officers average
about an arrest per officer in an eight-hour shift). Would
foot patrolmen make significantly fewer arrests? Even if
they did not, would the presence of foot patrolmen deter
dealers more effectively than undercover buyers? TNT
thus raises a question that has long bedeviled police
managers, especially regarding street drug dealers: to
what extent should arrest and conviction be the goal of
police, and to what extent should public feelings of safety
and civility be the goal. If the former is the primary goal,
TNT is a useful strategy, but if the latter is the goal, an
enhanced foot patrol presence, e.g., Operation Pressure
Point and other forms of enhanced patrol, ought to be the
primary narcotics enforcement strategy.

The Limits of Law Enforcement
In larger perspective, the law enforcement response to
drug distribution in the United States, whether by one
strategy or another, must be understood to be structurally
limited. A variety of structural factors impede the law
enforcement response to gangs and to drug trafficking
more generally. These limitations are virtually inevitable
in the context of enforcing the criminal law: (1) in a
democratic, free society; (2) against crimes based on a
market economy, and; (3) involving entrepreneurs who
sell products that are popular and illegal.
The United States Constitution, as well as our traditions
of fairness and due process of law flowing from that
Constitution, limits the discretionary authority of law
enforcement. In a totalitarian society, operating outside
constitutional restraints, police could enforce a rule that
anyone possessing or selling illegal drugs, or even

suspected of possessing or selling illegal drugs, will be
summarily executed by a special police narcotics unit.

wider markets, particularly in distressed populations, just
as segments of the alcohol and tobacco industries do.

But that hypothetical totalitarian society's narcotics police
would not constitute what we in this society mean by
"police." For although it is true that under the
Constitution police arv invested with awesome powers to arrest, detain, search and use deadly force - all of
these are monitored and constrained by our Constitution.
One would hope that few of us would choose to live in a
totalitarian society, which offers boundless discretion to
law enforcement. At the same time, we must realize that
there is always a tension between due process and crime
control, and that the Constitutional framework within
which law enforcement operates properly limits law
enforcement in its capacity to control illegal drug sale and
use.

It is difficult to achieve successful interdiction for another
reason as well. According to Rand Corporation economist
Peter Reuter, who studied whether our borders can be
sealed against illegal drugs for the Department of
Defense, our Mexican border is especially permeable.
There are few barriers from the south to bringing drugs
into that country, and the drugs can be "brought across by
small plane, private vehicle, or even by boat." 26 A
Mexican-American California narcotics agent made a
similar observation to me in an interview in 1989: "Four
hundred thousand of my people cross the border every
year. How can you stop a much smaller number who are
carrying a kilo or two of cocaine on their back?"

But if Constitutional norms place limits on the efficiency
of law enforcement, economic imperatives may impose
equal or greater ones. In evaluating our law enforcement
efforts we must be sensitive to the relationship between
demand and supply in the illegal drug market. The
National Drug Control Strategy, published in September
1989, acknowledges that "[d]espite interdiction's
successful disruptions of trafficking pattern, the supply of
illegal drugs entering the United States has, by all
estimates, continued to grow."23 Why should that have
happened? One part of the reason is that demand
generates supply - for drugs just i ·. for video cassette
recorders.
United States and European demand for drugs has
contributed to a rise in the number of producers from a
variety of producing countries. Some of these are political
allies, others are not. Key is the fact that demand has
generated multiple drug producers, followed by a rise in
production, with a subsequent drop in price. As Edmundo
Morales observes, "Unquestionably, drug production and
traffic in Peru have addicted thousands of people to illegal
sources of hard cash." 24 Price reduction in tum further
invigorates demand - which stimulates the whole cycle
over again.
Closely related is what might be termed the Darwinian
Trafficker Dilemma. "As we have expanded our
interdiction efforts, the Strategy continues, "we have
seized increasing amounts of illegal drugs. Stepped up
interdiction has also forced drug traffickers to make
significant operational changes ... Every time we disrupt
or close a particular trafficking route, we have found that
traffickers resort to other smuggling tactics that are even
more difficult to dctect." 26 So as we develop increasingly
sophisticated tactics for reducing both narcotic production
and smuggling, only the stronger and more efficient
producers and smugglers survive. This in turn heightens
supply and lowers cost. As this occurs, suppliers seek

A related issue discussed by Reuter is the limited costs
which interdiction can impose. Interdiction is supposed to
reduce street sales by increasing production and
smuggling costs- in effect, taxing these- and thus
raising the street price. This assumes that production and
smuggling costs constitute a significant percentage of
street price. But it is relatively cheap to produce and
refine a kilo of cocaine, perhaps around $1 ,000 for a kilo
that might eventually, when broken down into quarter or
even eight gram units, retail for $250,000. Smuggling
costs might amount to an additional few percent of the
retail price. Most of the retail price is divided among
those who distribute it on this side of the border. Rand
economist Peter Reuter writes, "Fully 99 percent of the
price of the drug when sold on the streets in the United
States is accounted for by payments to people who
distribute it." 27 We found a similar pattern in our study of
gang migration. As we reported above, gang members
migrate because they can double or triple their prices in
the Midwest over what they can demand in central Los
Angeles. Thus, a doubling or tripling of smuggling costs
would have a negligible impact on street price anywhere
in the U.S., but especially when gangs double or triple
their profits by extending the marketplace.
During the summer of 1989, police reported that gangs
(and others) were primarily marketing crack cocaine,
alLhough other illegal drugs were available as well. In any
event, crack cocaine was the marketing preference of the
LA street gangs, upon whom our attention was focused,
as well as the Dominican and Jamaican gangs in NYC.
From a longer range policy perspective, however, we
should not assume the stability of drug preference among
those who enjoy faster living through chemistry. We
know from history that drug preference, the epidemiology
of drug use, is less related to the intrinsic properties of a
drug than to the social definition of a particular substance
as the drug of choice. Twenty or 30 years ago, heroin was
the "problem" drug in American society.28 Today it is
crack cocaine.
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Suppose we actually could destroy the Peruvian, Bolivian
and Columbian cocaine fields? Lurking in the background
are a variety of manufactured drugs. It is likely that
underground chemists could design and manufacture what
addicts would consider the ideal drug - one with the kick
of crack and the longevity of crank (methamphetamine).
If we succeed in destroying agricultural drugs, we may
find ourselves looking at a designer drug problem more
potent and destructive than anything we have yet seen.
Indeed, a powerful new drug, a colorless and odorless
form of crystal methamphetamine - street name "ice" is said to be sweeping Hawaii and is threatening to invade
the West Coast ports of San Francisco, Los Angeles and
Portland. 29 Should that happen it would only be a matter
of time before the drug found its way across the country
to replace "crack" as the drug of choice during the 1990s.
The only good news "ice" will bring is its economic
challenge to the Medallin Cartel - but it is doubtful that
the distributors of the new drug will prove more
concerned for public health and safety than the cocaine
producers.
Moreover, as we attempt to put pressure on foreign
producers we will have to work with authorities in such
countries as Columbia, Bolivia, Panama and Peru. The
bribe is a familiar part of law enforcement in these
countries. Thus, the State Department's Bureau of
International Narcotics Matters found that Jorge Luis
Ochoa, a major Columbian drug trafficker, "was able to
buy his freedom through the intimidated and vulnerable
Columbian judicial system." 30 Tina Rosenberg observes:
"In general, the closer an institution gets to
the traffickers, the more corrupt it becomes.
Cocaine's new income opportunities for
judges have been well documented.
Prosecutors are less corrupt, but it is a matter
of logistics, not morals: it is simply easier to
win cases by bribing judges, or the police...
Policemen, the infantry in the war on drugs,
are usually young men from slum
neighborhoods with third gmde educationsexactly the profile of a drug dealer, and the
line between the two tends to blur on the
job."31
No matter how honest US drug enforcement agents, they
may find themselves operating in a climate of official
corruption.
What of our urban police? Unfortunately, we are all too
familiar with the legendary narcotics scandals which have
bedeviled the police in various cities. Perhaps the most
famous have occurred in New York City beginning with
the Knapp Commission investigations, including not only
narcotics, but other forms of vice as well. Patrick V.
Murphy was recruited as a reform police Commissioner in
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New York in the wake of the scandal uncovered by the
Knapp Commission. In his autobiography he writes:
"[W]e ultimately discovered that the narcotics
units under the previous police administration
had made major contributions to the city's
drug traffic. It was this area of corruption
more than anything else which most shocked
me."32
Narcotics corruption is not confined to New York City or
to the east coast. Deputies in the Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department were recently involved in what the
Los Angeles Times called "one of the worst corruption
cases" in the Department's history. Videotape shows one
deputy hurriedly taking three $10,000 bundles of $100
bills from a dealer's shoulder bag and putting them into
his partner's leather briefcase. 33 Although the possibilities
of corruption obtain in any form of vice enforcement,
only in drug enforcement do we encounter large sums of
cash and drugs held by perpetrators who are in no position
to complain against being ripped off by police.
By no means am I suggesting that all narcotics police are
corrupt. On the contrary, any number of aware police
managers, for whom Patrick Murphy has served as an
example of the thoughtful and honest police executive,
struggle with the potential problem. The Los Angeles
deputies were caught in a sting operation instituted by
Sheriff Sherman Block. High level New York City
narcotics officials, whom I interviewed, stressed that
integrity and police safety were the two paramount
features of narcotics enforcement in New York City. I am
suggesting that it is difficult to uncover narcotics
corruption particularly when a small number of
individuals are involved; that whatever is discovered is
likely to be the tip of the corruption iceberg; and that
coiTuption needs to be counted as one of the anticipated
costs of drug law enforcement.
Prison overcrowding offers an additional limitation on the
capacity of law enforcement to incarcerate drug offenders.
State and Federal prison populations expanded in
unprecedented numbers during the 1980s. The Bureau of
Justice Statistics reported at the end of 1988 that the
number of U.S. prisoners set a new record for the 14th
consecutive year. The Bureau counted 329,821 inmates in
1980. By 1988, that figure had risen to 627,402. Projected
from Department of Justice figures by The Sentencing
Project of Washington, D.C. the total for 1989 will
include 731,978 in Federal and State prisons, and 341,851
in local jails --1,055,829 altogether. 34 Overcrowded jails
and prisons are caused partly by newly convicted
criminals, but also by criminals whose probation and
parole were revoked largely because t11ey failed their
drugs tests when released to the community.

California, for example, had a 3,200 percent increase of
parole violators returned to prison between 1978 and
1988. 35
As our advanced drug testing technology consigns more
parolees and probationers to prison, we find we cannot
continue to convict and impose longer sentences without
building new prisons. The need for prison and jail
capacity is widely recognized. The National Drug
~thus recognizes the critical lack of prison space
as we expand law enforcement. It observes that "Most
state prisons are already operating far above their
designed capacity." And also that "many states have
been forced under court order to release prisoners before
their terms have been served whenever a courtestablished prison population limit has been
exceeded. " 36 In recognition of the shortage of prison
space to house convicted offenders and probation and
parole violators, state governments must persuade
their citizens to support new prisons. "The task of
building prisons remains with state governments, who
poorly serve their constituents when prison construction is
stalled or resisted." 37 Unfortunately, such exhortation
may not prove to be practical. Even those citizens who
demand longer and more certain sentences are reluctant to
pay for prisons and sometimes even more reluctant to live
next door to them. Thus, highly publicized plans for a 700
bed Federal prison to house convicted Washington, D.C.
drug dealers at Fort Meade, MD. were withdrawn the day
after they were announced, The New York Times
reported, because "there was too much public
resistance. " 38
Even if we could build new prisons, imprisonment is not
necessarily stigmatic, nor entirely foreboding for those
who sell drugs. In our interviews with imprisoned
California drug dealers39 we found that imprisonment may
offer a kind of "homeboy" status, especially for gang
youth, for whom the prison can become an alternative
neighborhood. Moreover, imprisonment often motivates
prisoners in their troublesome ways. Consigned to the
margins of society anyhow, in prison they join gangs, use
drugs, and make useful connections for buying and selling
drugs. The penitentiary was perhaps once a place for
experiencing penance. Today's correctional institutions,
overcrowded as they are with short term parole violators
(many of whom have failed their court mandated drug
tests) often serve functions similar to those conventions
perform for academics and business people - as an
opportunity for networking.
When we incarcerate drug dealers in prisons, we also
encounter what might be termed the Felix Mitchell
Paradox, in honor of the West Coast's formerly most
infamous drug distributor. In the mid-1980s, a Federal
Strike Force, with considerable assistance and dogged
investigation by an incorruptible Oakland Police vice

squad, succeeded in convicting and imprisoning the East
Bay's three leading drug dealers. Among these was the
legendary Felix Mitchell, who was later killed in
Leavenwmth Federal Prison and was a hero to the
thousands who turned out for his funeral. 40 Theoretically,
Oakland's streets should have been cleansed of drugs. Did
that happen? Hardly. The main result was a drop in price
and a rise in street homicides and felonious assaults by
gang members as they challenged each other for market
share. As territorial arrangements have stabilized, so has
the homicide rate - but the street price of crack has
remained about the same or declined.
Peter Reuter makes a similar observation concerning the
District of Columbia's soaring homicide rate. Reuter
argues that when the supply of drug dealers exceeds the
demand for drugs, "one obvious way to raise earnings is
to eliminate the competition through violence." Inactivity
by the District's police during the 1980s might be an
alternative explanation. But the arrest data show the
opposite, that is, a sharp rise in activity. Only 58 juveniles
had been arrested for dealing offenses in 1981; by 1987
that figure had reached 1,550. In 1981 adult arrestsusually of men in their early twenties -totaled 408; by
1987 it was 5,297.41
Similarly, the escalation in drug selling and violence in
Oakland, California, persuaded the legislature and the
Governor to provide four million dollars from 1985 to
1987 to bolster and expand prosecution, probation and the
courts. UC Berkeley's Center for the Study of Law and
Society was contracted to evaluate the initiative. Malcolm
Feeley, Richard Berk, Roseann Greenspan and I formed a
research team to undertake the evaluation. Following an
ethnographic and statistical study, we concluded that all
of the law enforcement agencies carried out their mandate
thoroughly and professionally; and that the intermediate
goals of more prosecutions, more convictions and more
probation violations were met. Unfortunately, crime, and
narcotics crime in particular, continued to increase. So we
concluded that, contrary to popular mythology, "The rise
in narcotics crime in Alameda County cannot be
attributed to inefficient courts, prosecutors, probation
officers or police." 42
Still, of all the enforcement initiatives, the least effective
will be those aimed at military interdiction, the most
satisfying-- at least initially- those which involve the
community and local police. The Strategy argues that
"The first challenge facing our criminal justice system is
to help reclaim neighborhoods that have been rendered
unsafe by drugs." How we do that is not entirely clear. In
a recent National Institute of Justice publication Mark
Kleiman, a proponent of street level drug enforcement,
points to two special threats that street drug dealing poses:
that children may become users, and that street dealing
may become disruptive or violent.43
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There is much disagreement, however, about the
effectiveness of neighborhood police crackdowns. 44 In the
same publication, prosecutor Kevin Burke favors street
level enforcement, arguing that "[W]hen balanced against
the environment of an open drug market, a visible, active
police presence is not a tremendous intrusion and
therefore not a significant cost of a street-level
operation."45 Thus, although initiatives like New York
City's Operation Pressure Point and other buy-bust
enterprises are limited in their effectiveness, at least they
are directly responsive to citizen calls for assistance. Of
course, drug dealers may displace their operations in
response to police initiatives, but a police presence may
be valuable in reducing fear of crime if not crime itself.
At the same time, some law enforcement officials are
skeptical about the positive effects of crackdowns.
Minneapolis police chief Anthony Bouza writes:
"Focused, saturation street enforcement will
clean up an area, but it is costly and
inefficient. It robs other areas of their fair
share of scarce resources and it does not
eliminate the intractable problem of drug
dealing, merely displaces it. It also focuses,
inefficiently, on the lowest level of the
criminal chain and is sure to lead to abuses
and repression, with sweeps and round-ups. "46
So it is not clear how law enforcement will be able to
repair the damage drug dealing imposes on local
communities, and what the larger social costs are of an
expanded police effort in this direction. Everywhere we
looked police are seeking counsel and support from
private citizens and community organizations, both for
identifying the problem and for taking steps within the
community itself to resolve at least a portion of it.
Everywhere police departments are, with greater or lesser
success, trying to organize community-based crime
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prevention activities, ranging from organized public
surveillance such as Neighborhood Watch, to
informational newsletters, to groups which will wipe out
graffiti. In addition, most police departments have
reoriented a portion of traditional patrol activities in favor
of pro-active anti-drug and gang enforcement.
These activities are media favorites. Nothing is more
telegenic than a raid on a crackhouse. The television
media and the police seem to be in an almost symbiotic
relationship in this respect. The raid shows the police
actively and forcefully engaged in anti-drug activity,
while the media's need for dramatic action to capture the
viewers attention is fulfilled. 47 At the same time, in every
community we studied, the police are themselves
increasingly and acutely aware of the limits of law
enforcement. New York's Narcotics Chief John Hill
summarizes a theme we heard time and again when he
says, "The easiest thing to do is make an arrest for drugs.
The hardest thing is to stop the drug trafficking."
Increasingly, it would seem, police are coming to see the
drug problem as a social, economic and educational issue,
rather than primarily as a law enforcement responsibility.
So too does the public. A Gallup poll released on June 21,
1989, found that although crime is not on the rise, it is a
major public concern, with 84 percent of the public
believing that crime has risen in the past year. Fifty-eight
percent of those interviewed believed that drugs are the
major factor responsible for crime, but have little
confidence in either the courts or the police to do anything
about the problem. Although the public favors tough anticrime measures - for example, 54 percent favor tougher
parole standards- only a minority (32 percent) advocate
improved law enforcement as the best method to reduce
crime. The overwhelming majority (61 percent) seem to
appreciate the limits of law enforcement and advocate
attacking social problems as the best method to reduce
crime.48

ENDNOTES
1

California Bureau of Criminal Statistics and Special Services, Crime
and Delinquency in California in 1988, p. 150.
2
NIT Reports, No. 215, U.S. Department of Justice, July/August 1989.
3 "Drug Use in California," 'The 1990-91 Budget: Perspectives and
Issues, Report from the Legislative Analyst's Office to the Joint
Legislative Budget Committee, p. 155.
4
A. Morgan Ooud, Ill, "Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of
the Possible Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy," 42
Vanderbilt L. Rev. 725, 752 (1989).
5
NIT: RESEARCH IN ACTION, Drug Use Forecasting, December
1989,p. 6.
• U.S. Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics,
1988, Table 3.115.
7 James Q. Wilson and John D. Dilulio, "Crackdown" in The New
Republic, July 10, 1989, p. 21.
8 Joseph G. Weis, "Crime Statistics: Reporting Systems and Methods,"
in Enc. of Crime and Justice, Sanford Kadish, ed., (New York: The
Free Press, 1983) 378-392.
9 On September 29, 1989, 20 tons of cocaine were seized in a San
Fernando Valley warehouse by local and federal drug enforcement
officials. And on November 4, 1989, eight tons of cocaine were seized
by officials in New York City. Also see Miami brief.
10 Based on interviews with Chief Larry Joiner, Major David Barton, and
Assistant U.S. Attorney Linda Parker, as well as a number of other
Kansas City police officers who conveyed essentially similar historical
information.
11
Letter from then Captain David M. Barton to me.
12
Publ. L. No 99-570 (Oct. 27. 1986).
13
Ronnie M. Scotkin, "The Development of Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Drug Trafficking Offenses," 26 Crim. L. Bull. 50 (Jan.Feb. 1990).
14
San Francisco Chronicle, Sunday Punch magazine, February 18, 1990,
p. 8.
ts Scotkin, op. cit. 53.
16
Seattle Police Department, Annual Re.port. 1988, p. 15.
17
For a discussion of these ideas, see Jerome H. Skolnick and David H.
Bayley, The New Blue Line, (The Free Press, 1986); and Communitv
Policing, Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice Series, NIT, May
1988.
18
Letter from Director William J. Bennett to Chief Patrick Fitzsimons,
February 9, 1990.
19 The New York Times, January 5, 1990, National Ed., A 10.
20
J.H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, (New York: Wiley. 1966, 1975)
p. 45.
21
"Blythe Street Group Offers to Finance Police Patrols," The Los
Angeles Times, August 11, 1989.
22 Op. cit. November 22, 1989. Valley edition, p. 3.
23
P. 73.
24
Edmundo Morales, Cocaine: White Gold Rush in Peru, University of
Arizona Press, Tucson, 1989, 174. This book offers an outstanding
ethnographic description of the Peruvian cocaine economy and effect
on the Peruvian people.

25

Strategy, 73.
P. Reuter, "Can the Borders be Sealed?" 92 The Public Interest, (1988)
51, 55.
27
Reuter, op. cit. p. 56.
28
J. Kaplan, The Hardest Drug: Heroin and Public Policy. University of
Chicago Press, 1983.
29
San Francisco Chronicle, August 31, 1989.
30
United States Department of State: Bureau of International Narcotics
Matters, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. (March
1988). p. 86.
31
Tina Rosenberg, "The Kingdom of Cocaine: A Report from Columbia," The New Re.public (Nov. 23, 1989) 28.
32
Patrick V. Murphy, Commissioner: A View from the Tqp of American
Law Enforcement. 245.
33
The Los Angeles Times, October24, 1989.
34
The New York Times, Tom Wicker, October 13, 1989.
35
In 1988, about 47 percent of the admissions to California state prisons
were of parole violators returned to prison by the Parole Board without
a conviction for a new charge. See Sheldon Messinger, et.al., Parolees
Returned to Prison and the California Prison Population. Sacramento,
CA: California Bureau of Criminal Statistics, 1988.
36
Strategy 26.
37Id.
38
April18, 1989. The Wall Street Journal reported on October 20, 1989,
that Mr. Bennett has attributed the halting progress of the Washington,
D.C. war on drugs to "local officials" whose "politics" has blocked
new prison construction.
39
Jerome H. Skolnick et. al., The Social Structure of Street Drug
Dealing, California Bureau of Criminal Statistics Reports, 1988.
40
The story of Felix Mitchell and his drug operation is told by Michael
Covino, "How the 69th Mob Maximized Earnings in East Oakland,"
California, November 1985, 83.
41
Peter Reuter, "The D.C. Crime Surge," Washington Post, March 26,
1989.
42
R. Greenspan, R.A. Berk, M.M. Feeley and J.H. Skolnick, Courts,
Probation and Street Drug Crime, Center for the Study of Law and
Society, 19 8 8.
43
Mark A.R. Kleiman, "Crackdowns: The Effects of Intensive
Enforcement on Retail Heroin Dealing," in Marcia R. Chaiken, Street
Level Enforcement: Examining the Issues, NIT, August 1988,3, 9.
44
See the critiques of Kleiman's article by Arnold Barnett and Anthony
V. Bouza in Chaiken, op. cit.
45
Kevin M. Burke, "Comments on Street Level Enforcement Activity,"
in Chaiken, op. cit. 53.
46
Anthony V. Bouza, "Comments on Street Level Drug Enforcement" in
Chaiken, op. cit. 47, 49.
47
For further analysis of media distortions of police activity, see Jerome
H. Skolnick and Candace McCoy, "Police Accountability and the
Media," 3 American Bar Foundation Research Journal (Summer 1985)
521.
48
San Francisco Chronicle, June 21, 1989.
26

39

